letters attached to the Rhet. ad Alex. and the Hist. Alex. Magni
(p. XI) is less well motivated since the edition includes obvious-
ly spurious letters anyway.   *H. Thesleff*

*Wayne N. Thompson: Aristotle's Deduction and Induction: Introductory
    Analysis and Synthesis.* Rodopi N.V., Amsterdam 1975. 114 p.
    Hfl. 20.-.
At the beginning of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says
that all teaching and all intellectual learning is produced by al-
ready existing knowledge. In his introduction to the Aristotelian
ideas of deduction and induction W.N. Thompson has taken this ad-
vice seriously - for the most part the matter treated is such that
it can be found in any introduction to Aristotle's thought. The on-
ly exception is the attempt to clarify the methods of deduction and
induction in rhetoric and dialectic; this is often neglected in gen-
eral accounts.
    Much space has been devoted to the enthymeme. The writer crit-
icizes attempts to define it as an elided syllogism. After a survey
of the context, material, and form of the enthymeme Thompson char-
acterizes it as "any deductive argument employed to further the com-
municator's persuasive ends". In Chapter Four devoted to induction
example, analogy, and *a fortiori* are discussed as inductive forms.
    The book thus sheds some light on the relationships between
demonstrative, rhetorical and dialectical arguments in Aristotle.
The general characterization of the nature of Aristotle's scientif-
ic thought is not satisfactory, however. The writer has not suffi-
ciently consulted the modern discussion of Aristotle's methodology
(e.g., Barnes, Hintikka, Patzig). Thus he is not sensitive to the
highly problematic nature of his "succint explanations" of notions,
elementary to Aristotelian deduction and induction.
    When, for example, he characterizes the Aristotelian necessi-
ty as "true in every instance" (p. 54-55), he should have added an
explanation of how to distinguish between assertoric and apodictic
syllogism. As it is, the rules given on pages 35-37 remain problem-
atic. Clearly erroneous is the claim that there are far-reaching
exceptions to the Law of the Excluded Middle (one of the examples
mentioned on p. 31 is the Golden Mean). A strange philosophical in-
sight guides the author when he defends the existential presuppo-
sition present in Aristotle's methodology by maintaining that the
question *quod sit* is meaningful only if the answer to the question
an sit is affirmative (p. 49).   *Simo Knuuttila*

Plutarch's Moralia. Vol. XIII, Parts I-II: 999C-1086B. With an Eng-
    lish translation by *Harold Cherniss,* index compiled by *Edward N.*
    O'Neil. The Loeb Classical Library Nos. 427 & 470. Harvard
    University Press, Cambridge Mass. - William Heinemann Ltd,
    London 1976. XXVI & XXVI, 885 p. £ 2.95 & 3.40.
    These new Loeb volumes represent the scholarly trend which is