The fragments and testimonia relating to the two most notorious ἀθεοί of ancient Greece are here brought together in a new Leipzig Teubner edition. Consistent atheism was always an odd and peripheral phenomenon in antiquity, certainly not only because of the amount of intellectual and/or civil courage it involved. And a work combining precisely Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene seems somewhat out of place. There is no real connection between the two, apart from the fact that they were later regarded as the chief exponents of extreme impiety. Diagoras was an unsuccessful 5th century poet and trouble-maker with an ambivalent attitude to religion. Theodorus (end of 4th c. B.C.) can be described as a philosophical materialist with both cynicizing and Aristippean views.

Winiarczyk's edition is, however, of a very high scholarly quality. He has found quite a number of new testimonies, especially for Diagoras, though nothing very sensational. This new collection by far supersedes the earlier editions: Lana 1950, Jacoby 1959 (and various collections of lyrical fragments) for Diagoras; and Giannantoni 1958 and Mannebach 1963 for Theodorus.

H. Thesleff


This handy little volume, originally a doctoral dissertation, tackles the eternal problem of the genesis of Plato's theory of Forms mainly from the logical side. The author's basic contention is that Plato slightly misunderstood the 'relation of context to contradiction', and that this misunderstanding led him to posit Forms with their typical properties of unique, changeless, contradictionless, etc., existence. I think the book makes it reasonably clear that this was one reason why Plato held the theory; and this is also one reason why he tried so safeguard his Forms from any suggestion of real or apparent contradiction (p. 96).

Jordan attempts to demonstrate that the various traditional ways of explaining the genesis of the theory are inadequate and even misleading. For the most part he seems to be right, although not always on the specific grounds which he offers. It could be argued, however, that Jordan's logical approach is, as such, as inadequate as the traditional ones are, and that it complicates the matter to a degree which is not always beneficial. For my part I am convinced that a one-sided view will never fully explain the theory. I also believe that there is still much to be said in favour of the old notion that Plato's vision of his Forms was originally a rather intuitive combination of several pre-Socratic trends of thought with the Socratic search for universals; what Plato, then, says of his vision very often has