


Un libro interessante, ma troppo lungo. Certo le intricate questioni connesse con la parzialmente disperata Quellenlage hanno indotto l’autore a trattare molto diffusamente ogni possibile aspetto. E’l’ha fatto con onestà e serietà, per cui non si dovrebbe rimproverarlo troppo per la lunghezza delle sue dimostrazioni. In fin dei conti, ha prodotto una biografia, la cui simpatia verso l’argomento non arriva per l’entusiasmo. Il volume si può raccomandare a chi voglia ottenere un’immagine più completa della storia dell’epoca e della politica svolta dal 429 alla caduta di Aezio nel 454. Sono state incluse due appendici. Nella prima il Panegirico di Merobaude viene convincentemente datato all’autunno del 438, nella seconda l’autore spiega la coniuratio Marcelliana del 456/8 come tentativo dei senatori gallici di mantenere la loro influenza politica dopo la morte di Avito.

Heikki Solin


This book should be of considerable worth to those interested in Spain and matters relating to the Iberian peninsula. To be sure, it does not introduce any new arguments, nor does it deal with old arguments in a particularly new way. Mr. Richardson’s book did, however, bring some new thoughts to mind. When reading the painstakingly careful descriptions of the exploits of the Roman conquerors in Spain, one cannot help thinking that this is like Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Take the case of Cato, for instance, an exemplary guardian of morals for generations, and active in Spain from 195 B.C. (p. 80ff.) — though it was lucky for him that in Imperial times there were no Song My trials.

It may seem ill advised to put forward such unhistoric parallels, but this is what the author does in the concluding chapter (p. 177ff.), where he states that the picture he wants to give of the Roman expansion in Spain after the victory against Hannibal can be compared to the spread of European imperialism from the 1870s on: “colonial empires were formed by ‘the men on the spot’ for personal motives”. This is indeed a very unhappy parallel. As Mr. Richardson states at the outset (p. 1ff.), Roman imperialism is much discussed and various reasons (and apologies) are given for the expansion, and rightly so. But if there ever was a period when one can talk of countries seeking dominance because of powerful economic interests working within the state, then this period is surely the end of the 19th century. Blaming everything on the “men on the spot” is indeed a very misguided view. But in Spain, the “men on the spot” do play a great rôle, and Mr. Richardson gives this fact full emphasis. ‘Hispaniae’ is chronological in structure (with five Appendixes at the end, on topics like “Praetors and provinciae 197—95”, “The sources of Appian’s Iberikê” and “The Tabula Alcantarensis”) and focuses on the Roman commanders, and praetors from 197 B.C. on (consulars from the 150s B.C.), in Hispania Citerior and Ulterior. This means the book is
mainly prosopographical in its outlook. Much reference is made to the names of Romans and native tribes, and the many manoeuvres and fights are very carefully analyzed on the basis of the literary sources.

The author’s analysis of the concept of *provincia* is of general interest. He states (p. 4ff. and 178ff.) that this term did not cover a geographical area, but just denotes a command. When magistrates were given one of the two Spanish *provinciae*, the Senate just conferred the command but did not have annexation in mind. Thus the Senate played a passive rôle, and we are back to “the men on the spot”. Their search for glory, triumphs etc. was the prime mover in the process that finally led to the Romanization of the peninsula. The author does not deny economic motives, but takes a stand against William Harris, who “believes that the Roman senate was determined, for motives of greed and the exercise of military power, to annex any territory it could” (p. 2).

In a very thorough review of Harris’ well-known work (War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327—70 B.C., Oxford 1979) Walter Eder comments upon the treatment of the annexation policy (Gnomon 54 [1982] 549—54). While he gives Harris full credit for emphasizing the “ideology of laus and gloria” and for pointing to the vast economic gains the expansion brought the state and the individual, he is not satisfied with Harris’ explanation for the non-annexation of many territories during the II century B.C. Eder stresses the more or less open conflict between the interest of the Senate as a body, and the potential governors of annexed provinces, who could grow very powerful in their office. But the policy of non-annexation did not mean non-involvement.

Mr. Richardson’s book thus provides a useful perspective on the Harris-Eder debate, both as an illustration of the “ideology of laus and gloria”, and because it gives much space to the treatment of the relations between the Senate and “the men on the spot” in Spain.

*Christer Bruun*

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This is an interesting and well-written book. Apart from introductory remarks, it consists of two parts. The first deals with Galilean society in the second century: population, the relationship of Jews to gentiles, and village life; the second is an attempt to locate the position of the rabbis within Galilean society with special focus on their lack of jurisdiction competing with local and Imperial jurisdiction (the problems of local and Roman administration are also discussed at some length). Goodman draws on rabbinic as well as nonrabbinic sources and tries to demonstrate that Galilean villages resembled the contemporary villages of Syria. But that statement should be questioned. Nothing like the emergence of rabbinic authority among the Jews seems to be noticeable in other Semitic populations of Palestine or Syria. The authority of the rabbis was indeed limited, but even with all its limitations this authority over the local population must have differed radically from the situation in other part of the Semitic Levant. But when the author concludes that