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In short, Plato's so-called theory of recollection says that learning is actually recollecting knowledge that the human soul has already in prenatal existence. The mind is
by no means a *tabula rasa*. The claim is, perhaps unfortunately, connected to the Platonic idea of souls as eternal, as entities that exist both before birth and after death. The philosophical issues the theory attempts to address have therefore not always been appreciated enough. Dominic Scott’s book is a worthy attempt to view the theory of recollection from this point of view, and to place it in a historical framework. In what sense can the theory of recollection be seen as a predecessor of later theories of innate knowledge?

For Scott, Plato’s theory is a version of innatism, but its significance is largely in the way it raises the question on the origins of knowledge, rather than in the answers it gives. In his view, the theory is exclusively about philosophical knowledge, and has little or nothing to say about ordinary, every-day concept formation. Its historical role in the debates on innate knowledge is that of a catalyst. To look for an ancient theory of learning that says something about mundane or pre-philosophical learning, or more precisely, about the origin of ordinary concepts, one must turn to Hellenistic philosophy.

Scott compares different versions of ancient innatism to seventeenth century dispositional innatism, claiming that the true ancestor of the dispositional innatism of the seventeenth century is not found in Plato, it is the Stoic theory. Between Plato and the Stoics and the Epicureans is Aristotle, a transmigratory figure, to whose thoughts the middle section of the book is dedicated. The book ranges boldly over these philosophers and as far as to the criticism of moral innatism by John Locke.

As Scott recognises, such a chronologically wide-scope approach requires certain selectiveness from the author, not only with respect to the philosophers chosen, but of topics as well. Scott focuses on three issues of learning and discovery: 1) the distinction between innatism and empiricism; 2) two levels of learning, philosophical or technical vs. pre-philosophical; and 3) optimism/pessimism with respect to ordinary cognitive achievements.

The two latter issues Scott sees as intimately connected, and they seem to be what actually drives the book. In an article in 1987, republished in the book, Scott argued that the widely accepted view that Plato’s theory of recollection explains not only philosophical discovery but also ordinary learning, is wrong. Plato’s interest is mostly in the former, and ordinary learning is given just a short, empiricist explanation. Moreover, the theory of recollection is accompanied by a conviction that what is learned by sense-perception is bound to be deficient and deceiving. The knowledge recollected is something altogether different. The gap between empirically gained information and true knowledge is wide.

According to Scott, Plato is not alone to draw this strict line between recollection and ordinary learning. Aristotle and the Stoics were more optimistic about the use of perceptual information in the process of learning, but even Aristotle’s emphasis is on scientific principles rather than on ordinary concepts. Epicurus may have been, together with the Stoics, one of the first to show more interest in ordinary learning. He relied on perception as a way of gaining reliable information and developed, along with the Stoics, views on primary pre-verbal concepts, *prolépseis*. These served as criteria of truth, accounting also for conceptual thought and the ability to understand language. But even Epicurus believed, nonetheless, that the aim of philosophy is to destroy false beliefs so often firmly connected to notions formed in this way, and to create new, philosophical ones in their place.
The first issue Scott focuses on is self-evidently of interest to any study on innatism. How should innatism be defined? What do we mean by saying that something is innate to the mind? And if an innate theory will accept some role to be played by sense-perception, how exactly will it differ from empiricism? Scott shows that even though Aristotle is an empiricist, he is a moderate one, for whom some innate dispositions like character traits and especially a desire to know fit into an otherwise empiricist theory of learning. Plato and the Stoics are innatists but of a significantly different version. For Plato, prenatal knowledge is latent in us, waiting to be revealed. The Stoics believed that rather than knowledge, humans have cognitive predispositions to form certain concepts rather than others. This, according to Scott, and the fact that the seventeenth century philosophers even used Stoic vocabulary of common notions and prolêpseis, makes their theory a descendant of Stoic dispositional innatism.

Scott is admirably capable of writing a philosophically interesting history of ancient views about learning and discovery, and he is sensitive to the different motivations and variations of theories. However, even though the book is explicitly not written to fulfill any "encyclopaedic ambitions", there are a few problems with Scott’s choices. It is apparent for example that the jump from the Stoics to seventeenth-century philosophy is rather abrupt, and leaves something to be desired from a book which makes historical claims about the origin of seventeenth-century innatism. Yet regardless of this, I found the comparison illuminating.

What I find more genuinely problematic is that even though Scott is a careful and appreciative reader of Plato, the great philosopher may not have been given a fair ride for his money. Scott’s view on what happens in Socrates’ discussion with the slave boy in the _Meno_ is far from uncontroversial, as is his reading of Plato in many places. For Scott, Plato has much to say about philosophical knowledge and ethics—about how, for instance, moral claims ought to be closely scrutinized—but next to nothing to tell about what he calls ordinary concept formation. This, I suspect, is partly due to the fact that starting from the theory of recollection, Scott has chosen to analyse the dialogues _Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus_, and _Republic_. It would have been interesting to see what he has to say about the material, for example of the _Timaeus_. Could it have made one more inclined to see a dispositional innatist in Plato? Or at least a philosopher who is, after all, interested in learning and thought more generally?

In a sense, the weakness of the book is also its beauty: Scott has his own particular and well-argued view, and he displays it elegantly and openly.

_Pauliina Remes_

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Lucretius’ choice to write poetry instead of prose is chiefly to make Epicurus’ rather rigid and epitomized doctrine of rationality more attractive to an educated Roman reader (especially Memmius, the poet’s patron). The mythological element in _De rerum natura_, also, has this aim, and Gale discusses this view by extensively allegorizing the conception of myth in Lucretius’ style. Myth, as rationalized and even demythologized,