

in verschiedenen Beiträgen in extenso wiederzugeben? – Der deutsche Ausdruck läßt stellenweise etwas zu wünschen übrig, und der Sinn kann gelegentlich dunkel bleiben (vertrautes Problem bei der Übersetzung wissenschaftlicher Texte).

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JON HESK: *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000. ISBN 0-521-64322-8. 336 pp. GBP 50.

The proverb according to which the journey is sometimes more interesting than the destination might be applied to this challenging and, in many ways, fascinating monograph. To sum up the epilogue, this study points out how concepts of true and false were not unequivocal or unchanging in literary representations of Athenian democracy. It becomes very clear, that although truth and honesty were desirable qualities in every branch of social life, it was equally self-evident that anyone could lie, and that everyone was aware of the fact that anyone could lie. This sad universal "truth" does not perhaps surprise the reader, but Hesk's way of exploring different aspects, genres and forms of deception and trickery is most rewarding, provided, however, that the reader has the patience to work through heavy structuralistic terminology and modern reference-literature. These make the reading-experience – in places – slow and wearisome for a reader who is not exactly familiar with all this.

The basic argument of the study, as expressed in the prologue, is that the idea of slandering rhetoric as a deceptive method of influencing people and general awareness of the concept of the "noble lie" in politics was not purely a Platonic anti-democratic invention (as suggested by Karl Popper), but rather emerged from the culture of "Athenian democracy" itself. H. states that it is not difficult to point out (and it has been pointed out, in fact) several passages in Greek literature where lying, cunning, the "μῆτις" are lauded. In addition, e.g., anthropological studies have shown that deception was used with general acceptance in the ancient Mediterranean as well as in other rural cultures. H., however, studies the representations and evaluations of deceit and wants to demonstrate that at least in "public space literature", lying and deceit were persistently described as negative qualities, in fact as qualities which were seen to be antithetical to Athenian identity itself. This does not exclude the fact that these terms could also be negotiable (as H. puts it) in certain contexts, and the author discusses these "discourses," too.

A sympathetic feature of this monograph is the exceptional openness of the author concerning the "agenda" and the "subjectivity" of his study. In addition to the author's own comment on this subject in the prologue, this can be seen in the structure of the book. Every chapter opens with a reference to more or less contemporary events involving questions of "honesty" and "deception". This gives a pleasant feeling of freshness to this study. My only complaint on this matter is that these reference cases do not always seem relevant. For instance, I would suggest that the Iran-Contra scandal has been wiped away at least from the minds of non-Anglo-American readers and been replaced with more recent war scandals. The author cannot, however, be blamed for not

having been able to forecast the political weather of 2004, and the way he parallels the British presentation of England as an "embodiment of truth" as opposed to Germany during WW II with Athenian speakers' views about Athens and Sparta seems very felicitous. Through these "digressions," the reader is introduced to different levels of the concept of "deceit" in Athenian democracy during the classical period.

Chapters one and two discuss the concept of "deceiving the demos," the presentations of military trickery and attitudes towards cowardliness and honesty in selected passages of literature, mainly by Thucydides, Demosthenes, Euripides and Xenophon. The overall selection of classical literature in the study is well argued in the prologue: H. does not focus on the most obvious literature on deception (e.g. the *Encomium of Helen* of Gorgias or the *Wasps* and *Clouds* of Aristophanes). This is partly because these texts have been studied elsewhere, and partly because the author wants to offer us texts, which illustrate these questions in a more novel way.

The first chapter concentrates on the Athenian ideology of "democracy" and "self-image" and discusses how the Athenian legislation reflects a case where the people, the demos, were deceived by their leaders; the basic argument of the democratic system was that the demos could not make mistakes, it could only be misled. As H. points out, this is a complicated question since our sources for Athenian legislation from the classical period are scarce. It is not possible to determine with certainty whether an individual could really be charged with having deceived the demos, as Miltiades would seem to have been because of false promises after the battle of Marathon (Herodot. 6,136). However, it seems clear that, e.g., the *proklesis* procedure was seen as functioning as a sort prohibition against the possibility of deceiving the demos. There were probably also public curses spoken aloud in the meetings of the *ekklesia* and *boule* (parodied in Aristophanes *Thesm.* 335–351) and H. concludes that laws against "deceiving" the demos were symbolically important, inasmuch they could be interpreted as enforcing the idea of Athenian "openness" as opposed to Spartan "dishonesty".

The second chapter focuses on questions of military "trickery" and the problematics of deceiving enemies. In the beginning of the chapter, H. discusses the aetiology of the *Apaturia*-festival and its initiative function for Athenian young men being in the liminal space of the *ephebeia*, theory put forward by H. Vidal-Naquet. The story of the Theban Xanthus and of tricky Melanthus of Athens can be seen representing as the opposite of ephebic ideals (absolute honesty) and corresponding to the Spartan *krupteia* institution. "Trickery" belongs to the "otherness" and will be left behind by an initiation rite. H. takes a critical view of many points in Vidal-Naquet's argumentation, but also shows how well the myth could be read to support the idea of "the honest Athenian hoplite." This leads to an analysis of the Athenian self-image as "naturally" (φύσει) brave and honest as opposed to Spartan "otherness" with its inborn secretiveness, shrewdness and dishonesty combined with "taught/learned" military valour. This idealistic view of Athenian honesty can partly be attributed to the nature of hoplite war strategy, which was based on equally equipped soldiers on both sides fighting an open battle, but H. shows that it can be seen as being based deeper in the structure of Athenian democracy.

With time, war tactics changed and traditional hoplite warfare was proven not to be effective against the ambushes and sieges used by enemies. Consequently, it is not

surprising to see how military deception can also be a "negotiable term" in Athenian public discussion, especially when it could be connected with self-sacrifice. However, H. wants to stress that military "trickery" was always seen as inferior to open conflict and a positive notion of deceit was allowed only when it was placed in within a discourse of relations, not opposed to open hoplite-fighting.

H. also discusses (pp. 107–22) the interesting question of why military deceit was seen so negatively. In the funerary speech of Pericles, Thucydides rejects deception completely. But, on the other hand, there may in fact be some positive aspects of "deception," if applied to enemies. For instance, in the second book of the *Republic*, Socrates contemplates when lying may be allowed. In short, lying is, according to Socrates, acceptable if meant to protect friends from harming themselves "in madness," or in storytelling, and in relations with enemies. Socrates' views thus seem to stand in contradiction with the "Periclean" ideology, in which military trickery is never admissible. H. points out that Plato's ideas combine well with ancient ethics, that is, love your friends and hurt your enemies. Plato also divided lying into two categories, "true lying" and "lying in words," of which the latter was, of course, less serious. However, deceit, according to the Athenian view, is the result of fear (gods, for example, never lie because they do not have to be afraid) and could not be admitted in official discourse. Although this chapter contains many interesting remarks, the ideological change from Homer (where military trickery is acceptable) to the Athenian view that deception is equivalent with the fear of enemy might have benefited from further discussion.

At the end of the chapter, H. analyses some texts related to military trickery and Xenophon's *Kurou paideia* receives the main attention. Xenophon tells us that Cyrus finds out how he had unconsciously learned how to deceive when necessary and this had happened in the form of learning to hunt. According to Xenophon, training in trickery was thus veiled because, in earlier times, boys were openly taught to deceive their friends, for good purposes, of course. This, however, led to the misuse of this knowledge and then open education in trickery was forbidden. According to H., this analysis of education by Xenophon, who is known to have been pro-Spartan, can be interpreted as questioning both Spartan education, which makes people animal-like and "banausic" (an expression which made me spend quite some time with dictionaries...) as well as Sophistic/"Socratic" teaching which seemed to lead to relativism of values.

Chapter 3 deals with the γέννατον ψεύδος, the noble lie, a concept, which has been severely criticised as supporting oligarchic and totalitarian structures. As an introduction to the chapter, H. refers to theories of M. Foucault and M. Détienné, giving the latter full credit for his analysis of ἀλήθεια. H. discusses the opposing concepts ψευδῆ and ἀπάτη as reflected in Plato's *Republic*, in the oratory of Demosthenes, in the fragmentary Satyr play *Sisyphus* of disputed authorship and in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles.

In the *Republic*, in the myth concerning the metals, from which the concept derives, *gennaion pseudos* can be seen as a drastic but necessary method of maintaining order in the ideal society. H's analysis shows that a "noble lie" in Plato was understood as "pharmaceutical," that is, the purpose of it was to protect social rules. From H's discussion of the *Sisyphos* fragment, it becomes clear that opinions of gods and of religion as human inventions to control people were circulating widely among the 5th-

century intellectuals. In the case of *Philoctetes*, H. points out that the Athenian audience might have seen Ulysses' cold and betraying behaviour as being a variation of the "noble lie". This third chapter is, to my mind, the book's most brilliant part with refreshing ideas and is also most pleasant to read, too.

The final two chapters concentrate on rhetoric and its relation to Sophistic. The starting point of the discussion is the idea of Demosthenes that because the basis of Athenian democracy was rhetoric, it was crucial that the spoken word could be expected to be "true." From this "logocentric culture" arise the problems and the anxiety which sophistic education and oratory caused in Athens.

In the beginning of chapter 4, H. discusses the modern political term "spin," which I understood as meaning to somehow misuse one's rhetoric skills in order to gain profit. H. parallels "spin" to sophistic practises and shows how complicated it is to distinguish the "spin" (or sophistry) from the "spin of the spin." as one could put it. The author analyses different methods the speakers used in order to alienate themselves from the reputation of being sophists and to try to make their opponents look as dishonest as possible. As in the case of military courage, inborn capability in oratory was seen as more "honest" than acquired skills in speaking. It was a common *topos* in rhetoric to accuse one's opponent of having practised or of using "sophistic" methods, as opposed to the speaker's own allegedly natural way of speaking. Rhetoric could thus be used to expose the "spin", i.e. the deceptiveness. This is what H. calls "the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric." The point is that orators themselves make rhetoric look suspicious, and so the author shows that this anti-rhetorical discourse was part of the rhetoric outside Plato's antidemocratic ideology.

Speeches of Demosthenes and his opponent Aeschines are studied in order to analyse these aspects in practise. H. takes passages of speeches of both to show their endless *agon* about natural and learned capability in speaking. It is argued, that in these battles of slanders, a speaker could, if necessary, admit to being a "δεινὸς λέγειν", or even a logographer, but the accusation of being σοφιστής is never to be conceded to as being correct. In addition, H. interestingly discusses passages in Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches in which a person's physiological habitus is deemed to betray dishonesty, the "physiognomic of deceit", as H. phrases it. Aeschines, a former actor himself, intends to deflect Demosthenes' aspersions on his gestural skills by accusing Demosthenes of being a mimetic liar. H. also discusses methods of using *topoi*, also to use *topoi* to unmask *topoi* and alleged lies behind them (deconstructing the commonplace): the speaker can anticipate the *topos* and turn it upside down, i.e. because X has nothing to say, he will say it is "commonly known". Overall, H. points out how speakers use different strategies to represent themselves as "masters of truth" and the opponents as "masters of lies". It is also amazing to see how far a speaker would go to use his rhetorical excellence only to conceal it.

H. draws an extremely complicated picture of rhetorical culture, and the reader herself had difficulties in detecting where the spin is, this being, I suppose, the meaning of the author. It becomes brilliantly clear in how many ways the rhetoric of well-written speeches could/should be interpreted.

This study is highly recommended to everyone who wishes to see different aspects behind the Athenian ideological image of democracy, reflecting both its merits

and shortcomings. It is not always easy to follow the complicated argumentation and, in places, the text is somewhat cryptic, but all in all, the book rewards its reader with a feeling of discovering something new, this making the effort worthwhile.

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*The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic.* Edited by HARRIET FLOWER. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004. ISBN 0-521-80794-8. XV, 405 pp. GBP 55.

Whereas there is certainly no shortage of works presenting the (political and military) history of the Roman Republic, or of studies devoted to various specific aspects of this period, the Republic is conspicuously less covered than the Empire when it comes to works offering broader insights. Therefore, the volume under review here is very welcome. This anthology by an international team of experts, edited by Harriet I. Flower, examines Roman history and civilization in the period 509-49 BC from a broad variety of perspectives. Here the usual surveys of political and military history, which of course are indispensable, are accompanied with overviews of various aspects of social, economic and cultural themes.

The fifteen contributions to the book, most of them fully annotated, are grouped into five parts. The first part, focusing on political and military history, includes discussions of the Early Republic, the republican constitution, the army and navy, and the crisis of the Republic, authored respectively by Stephen Oakley, Corey Brennan, David Potter and Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg. The second part, on Roman society, contains accounts dealing with family and household (Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp), women (Phyllis Culham), economy and law (Jean-Jacques Aubert) as well as religion (Jörg Rüpke). Rome's Empire is the theme of the third part, which features discussions of Roman interactions with some of the peoples that were eventually subdued by the Romans (not solely from the point of view of military history). The growth of Roman power in Italy, and the gradual political and cultural Romanization of the peninsula in the period 338-31 BC, is analyzed by Kathryn Lomas. The Punic Wars, and their significance, are discussed by John F. Lazenby. The establishment of Roman hegemony in the East after the Second Punic War, and Rome's dealings with the Greek World, are addressed by Erich S. Gruen. Part four is devoted to Roman culture. The themes covered are literature (Elaine Fantham), (visual) art in context (Ann L. Kuttner) as well as spectacle and political culture (Harriet I. Flower). Part five is an epilogue on the later political and ideological influence of the Roman Republic, an influence which, as is well known, extends into the present era. This contribution, by Mortimer N. S. Sellers, focuses on the French and American Revolutions.

At the end of the book, there is a timeline, an extensive thematic bibliography and a general index. The book contains a little more than thirty figures (photos in black and white, line drawings and a few maps).

The contributors are drawn from the *crème de la crème* of the field of republican studies, and this reviewer can only note that they provide the quality one is entitled to