

bers of a unified world-wide guild within the Roman Empire (p. 233), so that the organisation of the associations reveals a correspondence to their social and political environment (p. 234).

Ian Rutherford chooses to write about Aristodama, an itinerant poetess (pp. 237–48), who figures in two decrees, one from Lamia and the other from Delphi. He has cross-references to Aneziri and Petrovic in n. 10 p. 239, to D'Alessio in n. 15 p. 240, nt. 38 p. 244, n. 40 p. 245, n. 45 p. 246 and to Chaniotis in nt. 41 p. 245. In contrast to Sappho who stayed on Lesbos, Hellenistic poetesses such as Alkinoe, Glauke, Anyte of Tegea and Aristodama herself enjoyed a degree of interstate mobility. By sponsoring Aristodama and also Nicander, Aetolians wanted to construct a pan-Aetolian poetic tradition and to forge a political community through song (p. 248). Angelos Chaniotis (pp. 249–69) lays emphasis on the contribution of orators, historians and envoys towards shaping memory (*mnemopoiesis*) in the Hellenistic world (p. 253). He proposes the neologism "mnemopoetic" to allude both to the constructed nature of Hellenistic images of the past and to the aesthetic qualities of narratives of the past (p. 254).

As a minor criticism I point out that references from p. 11, including the notes, do not figure in the index e.g. to Plutarch's *De musica* 1134b–c. Furthermore the mention of "wandering" in the index points only to p. 16, whereas the concept crops up throughout the book: neither "travel" nor "itinerancy" is indexed either. Quite clearly, however, the cross-fertilisation of the colloquium has led to frequent cross-linking within the book, especially to D'Alessio's article. The style of English used is elegant: Petrovic admits to having his language polished by Lilah Fraser and Alan Sheppard (p. 195), while Aneziri's paper was translated by A. Dumas (p. 217). The editors have done an excellent job: their introduction (pp. 1–22) aptly summarises and points forward to the contents of the book, emphasising the wider context of ancient networks of exchange, patronage and affiliation between communities.

*Stephen Evans*

JOHN HEATH: *The Talking Greeks. Speech, Animals, and the other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005. ISBN 978-0-521-83264-9. VII, 392 pp. GBP 55, USD 90, EUR 77.

In this book, Professor John Heath argues for the superiority of language in the archaic and classical Greek efforts at self-definition. His conclusion is that the lack of articulate speech served as a primary tool for distinguishing and dismissing the various marginal groups in ancient Greece. Furthermore, because non-human animals do not talk, their position was to function as the lowest level of the Others in the Greek world.

The first part of the book includes the chapter "Bellowing like a bull: Humans and other animals in Homer", the main focus being, however, to explore the "evolution of a hero", which, according to H., results from the strengthening of young men's ability in persuasive speech. The two cases are Achilles in the *Iliad* and Telemachus in the *Odyssey*. In the second part of the book, the positions of children, women, slaves and barbarians are discussed in reference to their degrees of incompetence in articulate and authoritative speech. The third part contains two chapters: first, H. connects the well-known decrease in animal imagery throughout the trilogy of the *Oresteia* with the increasing emphasis on the power of human *logos*, and secondly, there is a fresh reading of Plato's dialogues, especially the *Republic*, to show how Socrates' dialectic-

cal method can be seen as an effort to silence the opponent. Furthermore, H. connects silence as a deliberative choice with the *parrhesia* in the context of the polis.

Thus, the scope of this book is vast and the themes many. I concentrate here mainly on animal topics. H.'s study is valuable for its references to literature on the human–animal issues in antiquity and also due to his attempt to combine some parts of the debate with the modern one. H. regrets – and I agree – that many recent contributions to the human-animal relationship in Western cultural history offer peculiar and even completely wrong generalizations. A more detailed study is needed. It is worth mentioning, that a year after H.'s book came out, Ingvald Saelid Gilhus published her excellent book *Animals, Gods, and Humans: changing attitudes in Greek, Roman, and Christian ideas*.

Although I warmly recommend H.'s contribution to all who study non-human animals in antiquity, there are some difficulties pertaining to certain emphases in this book.

First, I am not really convinced about the validity of the main argument of the book when we are dealing with the situation of the archaic or even the beginning of the classical age. Urs Dierauer (1977) already pointed out that speaking and language as a distinctive human quality was underlined especially by orators and rhetoricians, for obvious reasons. Furthermore, as Richard Sorabji (1993) has shown, there was a vast amount of differences between human and non-human animals, which were recognized by numerous philosophers. Although H. refers to both scholars, he does not enter into real dialogue with their opinions on this issue. He cites Isocrates (*Nic.* 5–6, p. 11 – unfortunately, there is no *index locorum* in this book) and other orators to introduce his argument. Further study is needed, but on the whole, I am more inclined to suppose that the Greeks (at least before the classical period) largely held that there was continuity of linguistic skills, the lowest grade being the "language" of the animals. Although H. refers to the "evocative power" animals possessed for the Greeks, the phrase "the silence of the beasts" is, if not misleading, especially thin in the context of the rich Greek sound world and the famously keen Greek ear. H. handles the Greek views of the communication of animals – sounds and gestures – only in passing, although he briefly reports the current scholarly discussion about the language of animals in the Epilogue. Why not combine this modern discussion with the one in antiquity?

However, this critique does not detract from the main point of this study, because whether it was obvious to the Greeks that animals communicate or even have a language or not, the crucial feature was that their language — as well as the language of children, women, slaves and barbarians – was neither articulate nor authoritative. H. aptly discusses the power structures in the second part of his book. Still, terminological consistency ("speech", "communication", "language", "articulate *logos*"/"authoritative *logos*") would have helped to establish the significance of his more detailed conclusions on the esteem of the articulate language of male citizens in early Greece.

The second terminological problem lies in the use of the words "beast" and "bestial" and the attributes attached to them, which sometimes creates a kind of biblical (demonic) aura around the words. For example, while discussing Achilles' struggle to gain authority, H. seems to show that there is a connection between Achilles' "bestial state" and his inability to speak persuasively. H. argues that after the death of Patroclus, Achilles is the "most bestial"... "his most frequent partners in speech are non-humans: gods, animals, ghosts, corpses, and enemies about to become corpses" (p. 124). Why call this state "bestial" and not, e.g., "liminal"? Are animals known to communicate with ghosts in Greek culture? Moreover, is it not just this limi-

nal state – Achilles' own *experience* of otherness created by his grief and anger – that makes the hero more open to his enemy, Priam, in the end of the *Iliad*? And due to this openness, is it possible for them to find a common ground, both being mortals and living under the cruel oppression of fate? The Greeks sometimes stressed this shared ground for animals and humans as well – in contrast to the immortality of the blessed Gods. The shared ground made it possible to compare human life with the animal world as is carefully done, e.g., in Homer and in the tragedies, especially in the *Agamemnon*.

As always, we have to be very careful with the terms we use of the Others, because our languages are imbued with contempt for them. Although the early Greeks felt an obvious superiority to animals, animals were not, in principle, viewed as corrupt – or "beastly" in its most pejorative meaning – at least not before the Hellenistic period. Animals have their well-directed places in Greek culture and some of them were thought to be "bad", some not. It was the mythical monsters which were mostly viewed negatively due to their hybrid nature. Thus, I would prefer to see also gradation and continuity, not only the bipolarity in Greek thinking about the humans and non-humans – while the binary oppositions, of course, existed, too.

There are also many sentences which strike me as promoting the legacy of Humanism, especially when H. uses the words "nature", "culture", and "civilization" in Greek context (e.g. "nature unharnessed from civilization is rarely a pretty sight in the ancient Greek world", p. 138). The early Greek connotations to the word *physis* are, of course, not the same as our word "nature".

The word "other" or the Other offers the third terminological difficulty. There seems to be no discrepancy in meaning whether the word is written with a capital letter or not – this may be the editor's fault. While H. is well acquainted with the modern discussion about animal rights and the moral status of animals, the study of otherness (and the different kinds of otherness) is not presented as thoroughly. I especially missed the comprehensive approaches to otherness and alterity made by continental philosophers (e.g., phenomenologists and, of course, Jacques Derrida).

However, on the whole, I find the book well-written – an example of an articulate language – and of high scholarly standards. As a Finn, it was a delight to notice that we Finns seem still to be viewed as people who can cultivate silence (p. 18).

Tua Korhonen

THALIA PAPADOPOULOU: *Heracles and Euripidean Tragedy*. Cambridge Classical Studies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005. ISBN 978-0-521-85126-8 (hb). XI, 229 pp. GBP 48, USD 80 (hb).

Euripides' *Heracles* is a complex play that has been the subject of many differing views in scholarly discussion. It has been praised as well as reprehended, but in general, its value has been somewhat underestimated by the critics. Although *Heracles* has been studied widely during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a comprehensive reading of the play, which takes into account the diverse contexts of the history of Greek drama as well as fifth-century BC Athenian society has been lacking before Thalia Papadopoulou's *Heracles and Euripidean Tragedy*.