the author, Fred D. Miller Jr. (= M.), contemplates to what extent we can trace the origins of universal rights as we understand them today, e.g., human rights and children’s rights. M. first analyses Greek and Latin words that are used in the context of rights and justice (e.g., *dike, kurios, ius*) and then looks into Plato’s *Republic*, Aristotle’s *Politics*, the speeches of Demosthenes, Stoic philosophy and some Judaic and Christian writings. He concludes that without doubt we can find in these sources a concept of rights, but merely as rights of an individual to claims of justice against members of the same community. It is true that Stoic philosophy and early Christianity anticipated ideas of human equality but did not go so far as to declare "human rights" and this concept is a product of later times, mostly the Enlightenment.

As an overall statement it must be said that the range of texts discussed in this book is of great interest, although I would have warmly welcomed a chapter on Aristophanes, and that the authors of all contributions have made an admirable effort to link ancient texts with questions of modern political theory. Most of the papers themselves are indeed useful. However, the reader, considering that this is a handbook of sorts, cannot help asking in what way they are meant to belong together and to contribute to each other. I feel that the main problem of this book is the missing common thread, the lack of continuity. As a common thread one could perhaps see the concept of "democracy" which can be traced in each chapter, but there also seems to be some undesirable overlapping between the contributions. One also wonders about the planned target audience of this "Companion". On the other hand, it must be said that this book does offer a selection of high quality essays and that there can be no doubt that those interested in the political ideas of the ancient Greeks will find much of interest in it.

_Tiina Purola_


What is revolution? Did the ancient Greeks have one, or perhaps several? The concept of revolution is quite modern, and the way we are used to using it in our vocabulary depends heavily on the historical interpretation of the events in France in 1789. To answer the second question first, I would like to quote Robin Osborne at the beginning of the Introduction to this volume: "The Greeks had no revolution". Nevertheless, we are used to thinking that the ancient Greeks were revolutionary in many ways, in politics, art, philosophy, and the sciences – as a matter of fact, in almost everything we can think of. This is the *raison d’être* of this multi-authored volume, which is just as much concerned with our view of things in the past as with the phenomena that we are trying to interpret with our present concepts. To illustrate this I would like to quote Helen King (p. 247): "From the Enlightenment onwards, identifying the fifth century [BC] as revolutionary has been closely linked to our view of rationality, seeing the sixth-century [BC] ‘revolution’ as concerned with removing the gods from the universe, and the fifth-century one as removing them from the material lives of humanity (see also Chapter 5 this volume)."

Chapters 1, "When was the Athenian democratic revolution?" by Robin Osborne, and 2, "Revolutions in human time: age-class in Athens and the Greekness of Greek revolutions" by

---

1 See, for example, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 8, s.v. Revolution.
James Davidson, deal with democracy. Robin Osborne illustrates how scholarship has located the "democratic revolution" sometimes with Solon, other times with Cleisthenes or Ephialtes, depending on the motives and points of view of the researcher or his or her tradition in scholarship. Yet, as long as we at least pretend to live in a democracy, it is important to keep debating about the "democratic revolution" at Athens as an example of what it means to put power into the hands of people (cf. p. 28).

Chapters 3, "Reflections on the 'Greek Revolution' in art: from changes in viewing to the transformation of subjectivity" by Jaś Elsner, and 4, "What's in a beard? Rethinking Hadrian's Hellenism" by Caroline Vout, concentrates on Greek art. Jas Elsner gives us the general overview of what "the Greek revolution", that is, the invention of Western art is. Caroline Vout discusses Hadrian's beard in detail – a good example of how one iconographic detail can tell us a lot about the way how philhellenism or the admiring of the Greeks, in the way we see it, was in many ways a product of the so-called Second Sophistic in second-century AD Rome.

Chapters 5, "Religion and the rationality of the Greek city" by Thomas Harrison, and 6, "Rethinking religious revolution" by Simon Goldhill, take us into the realm of religion. Simon Goldhill asks the question (p. 143): "How is the expression of identity – cultural identification – affected by living in a revolutionary age?" This question brings to mind another question: Do we live in a revolutionary age now? Perhaps posing the latter question in reading this book is exactly what Robin Osborne says that the authors of this volume have hoped for, that is, that the readers will not only have rethought a number of aspects that might have been seen as revolutionary in ancient Greece, but have further been reminded about the fact that a lot of the things that we now call revolutionary can be a product of formulations not from Antiquity but from modern times.

Chapters 7, "Paying attention: history as the development of a secular narrative" by Carolyn Dewald, and 8, "Talking about revolution: on political change in fourth-century Athens and historiographic method" by Danielle Allen, turn to a more philological mode. Chapter 7 is concerned with the politics behind the writing of history by Herodotus and Thucydides, whereas Chapter 8 demonstrates how one (philosophical) concept – prohairesis – can mirror a revolutionary change in the way the leaders were elected and thus how the whole idea of democracy was seen at Athens in mid-fourth century BC. As Danielle Allen puts it (p. 188): "These spare textual details hinting at mutually implicated discussions of the prohairesis of sophists at a minimum justify the claim that in the mid 350s, Athens experienced conceptual turmoil around the question of how public figures should legitimate their pre-eminence."

Chapters 9–11 concentrate on certain aspects of the history of philosophy, medicine and music respectively. Catherine Osborne in Chapter 9, "Was there an Eleatic revolution in philosophy?" reminds us that often the story that we hold as true has its origin in the 19th or 20th century history of (in this case) philosophy. The effect that Parmenides, for example, had on his contemporaries, can and most probably has looked quite different from our point of view. We have been strongly influenced not only by early modern history of ideas but by the whole history of philosophy starting from Plato's view on Parmenides. All this may have little in common with the way the contemporaries thought of Parmenides, who, if nothing else, probably had access to a more complete set of Plato's writings than we do. Following the same lines as Catherine Osborne, Helen King in Chapter 10, "The origins of medicine in the second century AD", reminds us about the very different views of medicine even during the Second Sophistic
in the second century AD and modern times. The volume ends with Armand d'Angour's Chapter 11, "The New Music – so what's new?" with illustrative examples of what does or does not constitute a technological breakthrough in music.

Taking into account the vast range of topics and the amount of erudition shed on the pages of this volume, it is difficult to even try to assess the book in a holistic manner. One thing, however, is common to every chapter of the book: we are very much dealing with scholarly waves of emphasising one piece of evidence pro or contra another. And another thing is also true throughout this volume: revolution or no, the essays in the book offer many interesting (re-)thoughts both about Antiquity and the way we have formed our views on what might be claimed to be revolutionary about the classical Greek world.

Erja Salmenkivi


Vincent Farenga's Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece is a hefty monograph with an ambitious scope: as the title suggests, the author looks at how the performance of justice interacted with ideas of the individual or 'self'. The timespan ranges from the Early Iron Age to the Classical and the sources used from Homer to Attic orators. Farenga states performance theory as his main theoretical framework and sees citizenship itself as performative.

Farenga follows the development of the performance of justice from Homeric chiefdoms to Athenian democracy. For the Early Iron Age, he looks at archaeological reconstructions of social complexity but above all at Homer. In the first chapter, he argues that in the tumultuous times following the Mycenean collapse it was crucial to establish a sense of past and continuity. In Homer, this is shown by laments: they were an attempt by the kin to assert the value of their dead, which others would either acknowledge (by joining in the laments) or reject (by, for example, lamenting their own dead instead). Achilles is here seen as a trailblazer as he asserts his autonomy from Agamemnon and the rest of the community.

From this, Farenga moves on to the development of the basis of justice, running through chapters two to six. In Homeric society, basileis were myth-tellers as well as contemporary leaders, and they could take up the roles of any of the parties involved in a dispute in order to resolve it. As magistrates and jurors were introduced after 700 BCE, a new role model was needed to justify the juridictive power of this new group. Farenga argues the figure of Odysseus provided a framework for this, showing how multiple perspectives (as he encounters during his travels) are needed for good judgments. The situation changed again in the mid-7th century with written laws. Here Farenga sees parallels between lawgivers and poets (apart from the obvious overlap with Solon) and the increasing shift from popular sovereignty to close adherence and identification with lawgivers – the impersonality of justice, if you will. Finally, the last chapter looks at Alcibiades and Socrates as autonomous agents but with the latter acknowledging the supremacy of laws. Thus we see a movement from highly idiosyncratic justice – stemming, however, from a common mythical past – towards an ideal of impersonal judgments, this time stemming from commonly acknowledged wise lawgivers. It is here worth