deserves praise: having all these passages in contemporary English is an aid to teachers and scholars alike.

One could criticize the imbalance between the "Greek chapters" (1–6) and the "Roman chapters" (7–9) of the work, apparently due to the responsibility having been divided between different editors. In the Greek chapters, the scope is more comprehensive than in the discussion of the Roman education, as moral education is also included. In the latter part, the focus is on literate education. The editors could have considered including, for example, a passage from Seneca (not just on the *studia liberalia*, as on p. 207) or the first book of Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*. It is of course easy to point out omissions, but the fact that Marcus Aurelius is missing illustrates a second point of criticism that could be made of the sourcebook: its chronological scope follows the traditional orientation of Classical studies, in which the abundant material from Late Antiquity receives little attention. Of the authors that most scholars consider Late Roman, an important omission comes to mind immediately, namely Martianus Capella, who had an immense but not immediate impact on literary education.

The volume concludes with a bibliography (which contains almost exclusively research written in English), a general index and an index of passages.

*Kalle Korhonen*


Il lavoro di Giannisi, una versione rivista della sua tesi di dottorato (Lione II, 1994), esplora i rapporti reciprocì tra cammino e canto, ossia tra la via costruita e la voce dei poeti, nella Grecia arcaica. Nella prima parte vengono illustrate in maniera suggestiva le memorie concrete e visuali provocate dai numerosi monumenti (*anathēmata*, *agalmata*, *sēmata*, ecc.) esposti lungo le vie d'accesso ai santuari quali quelli famosi di Samo, Didima, Delo e Ptoion. Nella seconda e terza parte, l'autrice mette in evidenza l'interazione, anche metaforica, tra la via e il canto nella letteratura greca, anticamente osservabile nell'uso ambiguo dei termini *oimos* e *oimē*, ma rintracciabile anche nelle memotecniche (cfr. "le vie della memoria") nonché nelle nozioni di passo, metro e ritmo, o ancora nelle genealogie, nei cataloghi e negli itinerari poetico-letterari. Il cammino umano, infatti, come bene si sottolinea, va considerato decisivo per la formazione della memoria e della lingua stessa. Insomma, un libro stimolante, scritto con stile e originalità. Deplorevole, però, l'assenza di un qualsiasi indice.

*Mika Kajava*


In this multidisciplinary study with highly ambitious aims, Gabriel Herman (H) is in search of an Athenian collective way of reacting during the period of democracy (508–322 BC). In
this endeavour, H employs concepts from the field of game theory, social anthropology and behavioural sciences: for example, "co-operation", "conflict", "exchange" and "reciprocity". He also employs an analytical tool called "the code of behaviour" which he defines as "a set of moral principles accepted and used by society or a particular group of people" (p. 15). Since "[...] moral principles and actual behaviour constitute a single inseparable whole" (p. 16), the code becomes observable in the actions of the people. This assumption carries difficulties with it: in my opinion, it is far from unproblematic to assume that moral principles coincide with actions.

H lists three alternative ways to react in a situation of conflict: "a head for an eye", "tit for tat", and "turning the other cheek" (pp. 2–12). His main argument is that the strategy of the Athenians in situations of conflict was to under-react rather than to over-react. He argues that the Athenians were peaceful, forgiving, just, honest, moderate and altruistic patriots capable of controlling their impulses. The prime example given of this σôphrosynê is the amnesty of 403 BC. Other examples include, for example, the willingness of the Athenians to nurse the plague victims.

At the core of this study lies the question of whether democratic Athens was a society where retaliation was an acceptable way of reacting. This question of democratic Athens as a "feuding society", as he calls it, seems to be a part of a debate between H and certain other scholars (H especially mentions David Cohen with frequency). The whole book seems to be mostly an answer to the opponents of H – he makes it clear that in his opinion, "Greek pessimism" (a too negative view on Athens, p. 85) has gained too much ground among the historians and that his own view is just the opposite.

The questions, concepts, and methodological issues are introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides a general look at the norms and institutions of democratic Athens; the latter are taken to have reflected collective norms "almost perfectly" (p. 62). In Chapter 3, H discusses the difficulties of interpreting moral norms of antiquity. He accuses some modern historians of not keeping their own moral principles apart from those of the contemporary Athenians, calling this phenomenon "the fusion of moral norms" (p. 101). He states that the historians are acting unprofessionally as long as their interpretations differ: "Had they exercised their judgement more professionally, their accounts could not have been so wildly different" (p.101). It appears to me that H has an overly optimistic belief that there is only one truth that can be found by examining historical events by "objective" means. H, then, seems to view himself as a strictly logical natural scientist neither speculating nor making interpretations but merely observing and reporting objective data. This view occurs throughout the study.

In Chapter 4, H uses Thucydides and forensic oratory as his sources. He argues, persuasively, that since the law court speeches were presented in front of a jury consisting of ordinary citizens, they reveal what the shared ideals of the speechwriter and the jury were. In other words, by analysing the law court speeches we can find out what it was that the jury wanted to hear, I agree with this idea. But assuming that this is true, however, how do we know that these ideals actually coincided with reality? H passes over this question much too quickly, insisting that "everything we know about Athenian society militates against" the possibility that there might have been some double standards (p. 203). Instead, H refuses to believe that "[...] everybody paid lip-service to the 'official version', but nobody actually took a blind bit of notice of it" (p. 203). In my opinion, H is too quick to make this assumption.

Forensic oratory and Thucydides are the only sources that H accepts. He rejects both
drama and philosophy since these are too imaginative and general (p. 134). This has to do with H's ideal of objectivity mentioned above. He argues: "Pace Adkins, people on the stage do not generally behave as people do in real life. Pace Dover, they do not even sometimes behave as people do in real life" (p. 126). Though I can accept his exclusion of these sources, H is not critical enough with Thucydides.

In Chapter 5, H more accurately defines the development of a conflict and gives examples of modern "feuding societies", comparing them with democratic Athens. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss violence. Some arguments appear rather obscure. For example, in Chapter 6, H argues that since it was quite rare to carry weapons in democratic Athens, the Athenians were not violent. He also states that since Athens was surrounded by walls, the Athenians must have felt safe (p. 204). It remains unanswered how safety actually correlated with the Athenians' sense of security. Chapter 7, then, sets its sights on the punitive institutions of the state and the violence exercised by the démos. According to H, the Athenians were allowed to exercise violence only when participating in the punishments conducted by the state, not as private persons (p. 412). This is, again, used to support the argument that the democratic Athenian strategy was not to over-react but to under-react.

In Chapter 8, H discusses the historical development of man. I found this theme of change in Athenian mentality most interesting, but unfortunately the issue is touched upon rather briefly. H argues that while private revenge was allowed for a Homeric hero, in democratic Athens it had been replaced by public punishment: "[...] executions had [...] come to be seen as a rational measure designed to protect the community against any recurrence of his anti-social behaviour." (p. 294). The author also maintains that the absence of torture just before the execution implies "a preference for minimising the victim's suffering" (p. 294) and that "Both methods [of torture: whipping and wheel] were calculated to inflict only such pain as would elicit the 'truth', while causing as little physical damage as possible." (p. 302). H thus argues that though torture actually took place in Athens, the Athenians were not willing to torture. The problem is that H grounds this argument on the assumption that the Athenian collective strategy in a situation of conflict was not to retaliate but to turn the other cheek. In other words, H seems to let his assumptions (that are already embedded in the analytical tool) predetermine the results.

Chapter 9 focuses on the divine and the mythological. Here H gives a list of certain deities that reflect the Athenian way of reacting. According to H, for example, the way to present Athena as a battle-avoiding settler of disputes (p. 405) proves that the Athenians were not revengeful and violent. In Chapter 10, H compares the Athenian strategy with a computer simulation that applies "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". This computer programme favours the player whose strategy is to retaliate only after having been offended twice. H concludes that this winning strategy, "tit for two tats", was also the strategy of the democratic Athenians (p. 402). He takes Socrates as an example of this tactic, arguing that the Athenians were milder versions of the absolute non-retaliation of Socrates (p. 407). One might argue, however, that the way that the Athenians treated Socrates is in contradiction with H's conclusions.

I quite like H's approach to Athenian history. I do not reject the possibility of applying behavioural sciences in ancient history. I am also ready to believe that there were collective "unwritten rules" in democratic Athens and that some kind of collective way of reacting might have existed. Nonetheless, I find H's analytical tool — "the code of behaviour" — too rigid. There should be more room for conflicting interests — in my opinion; one could admit that there were
some conflicting interests between the Athenians without having to call Athens a "feuding society". H also seems to be too uncritical, over-confident and defensive of his results, appearing to defend the Athenians of the 5th and 4th century BC from the attacks of "pessimistic" historians of the 21st century AD. However, H has worked on his subject thoroughly and, in my opinion, it is a good thing for a historian to question generally accepted truths. This book will not leave its readers cold and is sure to provoke discussion.

Suvi Kuokkanen


In the past thirty years, the study of women's life in ancient society has produced a number of publications to which we can now add a new interesting and challenging book by Karen Hersch. Among the numerous aspects related to ancient women's life, the author has chosen to focus on the role that the bride played in the Roman wedding. It is certainly a major task, since any discussion on Roman women as brides must be necessarily based on the written sources which are, however, the product of the elite male. For her study the author has chosen a number of literary and antiquarian texts from the end of the Republic through the early Empire along with some iconographic examples of marriage scenes. The analysis of such evidence is carried out with the help of methodologies drawn from modern social studies, an approach that has been widely adopted in recent scholarship on the social dynamics in the ancient world.

The book includes five chapters, which are preceded by an introduction and followed by bibliography and illustrations. In Chapter 1, "The Laws of Humans and Gods", Hersch analyses the legal aspects of the Roman wedding, but she also considers the religious injunctions, as legal acts and religious rites were both necessary requirements for a legitimate marriage. In Chapters 2 and 3, the author discusses the stages of the wedding ceremony, which starts with the preparation of the bride and the activities that may have taken place in her house (Chapter 2: "At the House of the Bride"). It continues with the procession that accompanies the bride to her new house and the rituals performed there by the groom and the bride (Chapter 3: "To the Groom's House"). In Chapter 4, "Gods of the Roman Wedding", Hersch discusses which gods and goddesses were usually associated with the rituals of the Roman wedding. As Hersch correctly points out, the Roman wedding ceremony has been traditionally described as an orderly arranged ritual. On the contrary, as the author emphasises, every ceremony was different, depending on the couple's social status, tastes, and religious devotion to specific gods. Hersch's thorough analysis of these different aspects along with the bibliographic references make her work very valuable and leaves room for others to explore further particulars of the Roman wedding ceremony.

The work ends with the conclusions in Chapter 5, where Hersch interestingly explains the apparent oddities of the Roman wedding ceremony as aspects shared by other Roman rites and celebrations, such as the assumption of the toga virilis, the funeral, and the triumph. Like these rites, the wedding ritual was a form of rite de passage for the bride, who had to experience separation, transition, and incorporation, on public display.