The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, Mazzoni examines the bronze statue of the Lupa Capitolina itself: its background as well as its significance and influence through the ages. The second part of the book is an analysis of what has been written about the she-wolf. The third part concentrates on visual representations. Each of the parts is further divided chronologically (Antiquity; Middle Ages and Renaissance; modern and contemporary times), which makes the book well-structured.

The iconography and art-historical influence of the she-wolf in antiquity has previously been discussed comprehensively by Cécile Dulière (Lupa Romana, 1979) and Claudio Parisi Presicce (editor of the volume Lupa Capitolina, 2000). Mazzoni summarizes their results and integrates their conclusions with those of recent studies and her own analysis of the ancient literary sources and later representations of she-wolves. Some of Mazzoni's interdisciplinary viewpoints, focusing especially on various aspects of the she-wolf's motherhood, are a refreshing addition to more traditional interpretations of the she-wolf legend.

Mazzoni discusses the debate about the dating of the Lupa Capitolina launched in 2006 by Anna Maria Carruba's statement that the statue is of medieval origin. In addition to Carruba's arguments, Mazzoni presents more recent research that proves, the Sardinian origin of the Lupa's metal and locates the clay used in the casting just north of Rome.

The book also studies various associations of the she-wolf, both positive and negative. For example, in the misogynistic writings of the early Church Fathers, the she-wolf often represented promiscuity. Conversely, many cities and city-states, from medieval Siena and Perugia to 20th century Romanian cities, have erected monuments of the she-wolf as a symbol of their Roman roots. In the mid-1800s, during the Italian unification, the she-wolf stood for the ultimate goal of the nationalists: Rome (then part of the Papal States) as the capital of unified Italy.

Unfortunately, Mazzoni neglects to cite the excellent thesis of Nadia Canu (Le valenze del lupo nel mondo romano. Periodo arcaico ed età repubblicana, 2006), with its broad analysis of the Lupa's anatomy and significance. Also, Mazzoni inconveniently refers to ancient authors with the page numbers of their translated works, instead of the abbreviations with section numbers, more commonly used by classical scholars.

The strength of Mazzoni's book is in its wide historical perspective, and especially in her general discussion of the significance, interpretation and influence of the Roman she-wolf after antiquity.

She-Wolf. The Story of a Roman Icon is a vividly written book, which skillfully combines diverse sources and standpoints into a coherent and readable study. The black-and-white photographs, some of which were taken by the author herself, support the text and illustrate the diversity of the visual representations of the she-wolf across the centuries.

Mika Rissanen


Jean Roberts's Aristotle and the Politics is a very good contribution to The Routledge Philosophy GuideBook series. The aim of this series is to introduce students to the classic works of philosophy, and Roberts's book achieves this aim in an exemplary fashion: it gives the reader
an accessible and congenial interpretation of Aristotle's *Politics* and sets it in a context in which this difficult and disorganized work can be duly understood.

Roberts's book is based on a certain understanding of Aristotle's ethical and political writings: her thesis is that ethics and politics constitute for Aristotle a single area of inquiry, rather than two separate areas. This means, as she argues, that at the most general level, ethics and politics "have the same aim, and are constituted by the same expertise" (pp. 5–6). They both discuss the good and happy life, though in a rather different way. While ethics centres on the question of "what is a good and happy life," politics views the good and happy life in light of an "individual's place in the political community" (ibid.).

Roberts elaborates on this thesis consistently throughout the book. She emphasises that for Aristotle, human beings cannot lead a virtuous and happy life in isolation: they can entertain their rational capacities only as part of a political community, and their virtues are defined as fundamentally social. Roberts's main thesis also manifests itself in the structure of the book. In the extensive Introduction (29 pages), she gives an account of the good life as it is presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, including happiness, the function argument, virtues, justice and friendship. In the subsequent three main chapters, "Ruling the household", "Justice", and "The scope and aims of political philosophy", she applies this framework to examining what she takes to be the key questions and arguments in the *Politics*.

Roberts's style is clear and lucid, and her arguments are for the most part sufficiently worked out for introductory purposes. Roberts uses a number of textual citations as starting points for interpretation and clarification. For example, when discussing Aristotle's account of the nature of the *polis* in the beginning of Chapter 2 (p. 32), she cites *Politics* 1252a1–7 and relates the terminology of inclusion and hierarchy that is used to characterise the relations between the aim of a *polis* and the aims of its parts to a respective usage in the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (without an exact reference, however). In the course of her discussion, she occasionally contrasts her understanding of Aristotle's view with some alternative views (most often Plato's), or with some alternative understandings of Aristotle's view. For example, in clarifying Aristotle's thesis that humans are naturally political, she goes into some detail concerning Hobbes's understanding of Aristotle, and argues that the difference between Aristotle's and Hobbes's views, respectively, lies in their distinct ways of understanding what constitutes human nature (pp. 38–9).

Aristotle's *Politics*, as Roberts correctly points out, is a difficult treatise both in terms of its form and in terms of its content. It is a merit of Roberts that she does not conceal these difficulties from the reader. In the Introduction (p. 24), she refers to a variety of textual incongruities, including the proper place of Books 7 and 8 which has puzzled many commentators. In discussing Aristotle's arguments, Roberts occasionally becomes very critical, as is the case when she reviews Aristotle's defence of the traditional hierarchies within the household, especially the relations between master and slave, and husband and wife. Aristotle's arguments for these relations are regrettably weak and biased, but even in these cases, Roberts makes an attempt at understanding the assumptions that gave rise to Aristotle's view. For example, in commenting on Aristotle's claim that women's capacity for deliberation is without authority (p. 53), she refers to *History of Animals* 608a21–b18 in which females are claimed, apparently as a biological fact, to be less spirited than males.

In addition to the details such as the discussion on slavery, the *Politics* is difficult also in its main argument. In general, the work envisages and argues for an ideal political community, an aristocratically ruled city-state, which was losing its ground as a realistic constitutional
alternative already in Aristotle's own lifetime. Aristotle could not, of course, foresee that there would be no return to the Greek polis, but this does not ease our inconvenience in learning that he came to see an essential link between an ideal community and an ideal human life: in his view, the best human life can only be realised in an aristocratic society. This raises a serious concern: does Aristotle have anything important to say to us who have, as a matter of fact, no prospect of living in such a society, and who, as a result, would wish to conceive of the best human life in slightly different terms?

Roberts admits that much of Aristotle's political philosophy is incompatible with our modern conceptions of freedom and equality by which we justify our democratic constitutions and institutions. In these matters, she concedes, we are not likely to benefit much from Aristotle's work. However, Roberts asks us in her concluding Chapter 5 to look at Aristotle's political thinking from a more general point of view. What, in her view, might be of interest to us is the variety of things Aristotle considered relevant to discuss, and the way in which he linked them to one another. According to Roberts, we cannot and should not embrace Aristotle's idea of happiness, or his idea of a political community aiming at a single end, in anything resembling its original form, but we should, and in fact do, have some conception of the good life and the way in which it is connected to the structure and functioning of our political and other communities. Roberts's (implicit) suggestion is, then, that a study of Aristotle might help us to clarify our conceptions concerning these matters. I think this is a rather fair and sympathetic attitude to an ancient philosopher.

Roberts masters her subject so admirably that there is little reason for complaint. Nevertheless, I should like to mention two points. Roberts remarks in the Preface (p. vi) that she does not use footnotes, "because given the aims of the project it seemed impossible to deal directly with the secondary literature without making the exposition hopelessly baroque." I think this is a clear overstatement, but the author consistently and, as I see it, unnecessarily, refrained from referring to the various interpretative lines in literature even in the main body of her text. As a result, the book is in a sense more readable, but in another sense, it is less understandable and sensitive in certain points. I do not think that these points were too numerous, but, for example, the discussion on the relations between the aim of the polis and the aim of the good person (pp. 32–8), or the relations between citizen virtue and human virtue (pp. 76–82) would have benefited from at least an overview of alternative interpretations. This said, I should like to point out that the other volumes in the same GuideBooks series also suffer from this type of defect, so we may perhaps blame the publisher for this dogmatic editorial decision.

My second critical point concerns the evidence Roberts uses. She claims to follow "the standard practice of taking the Nicomachean Ethics as the canonical text and ignoring the other", namely, the Eudemian Ethics (p. 28). This is well-founded to a great extent in an introductory work such as this, but it would have been illuminating to say something about the relations between the two works, and their differences in relation to the Politics, for example, the fact that only the Nicomachean Ethics discusses the relations between ethical inquiry and politics, and that only the Nicomachean Ethics argues for the superiority of the contemplative life over the political one. This would have put Roberts's main thesis in a broader context.

Mika Perälä