Liberal theories of citizenship typically arise from the intuition that justice and the good, the two fundamental notions involved in any adequate theory of citizenship, need to be defined in different terms. The idea is that the account of justice should not be based on any specific and comprehensive account of the good and, in particular, the good life, because otherwise it would be incompatible with one of the most deeply ingrained assumptions in the liberal approach, the assumption that there is no one way of living a good life, but many. Thus understood, the liberal pluralist faces the challenge to combine a sufficiently general account of justice with pluralism concerning values.

This kind of approach arouses a number of concerns. Susan D. Collins motivates her monograph *Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship* by focusing on two: firstly, how can a liberalist pluralist justify the alleged priority of justice to the good, and secondly, does the same person have an elaborate view, or a view at all, about civic education? Collins contends that the current attempts to answer these questions are in many respects unsatisfactory. She states in her Introduction (p. 2) that although Aristotle's account of citizenship is fundamentally different from modern accounts, it is "a source of insight for us precisely because it does not begin from liberal presuppositions" (italics hers).

An account can be "a source of insight" in many senses, of course, but Collins has something more specific in mind. In introducing her main arguments, she claims, for example, that "the *Nicomachean Ethics (NE)* offers an account of civic education that is superior to those currently available" (p. 3). This is, she continues, "first, because it acknowledges the authoritative role of the political community and the law with regard to education, and, second, because it clarifies how this education bears on the question of the good" (pp. 3–4). This is a bold, critical argument. I am sympathetic towards the claim that Aristotle's account is a substantial source of insight for us, and that it can help us to be aware of the defects and deficiencies in modern theories, but I had some doubts about her argument concerning the superiority of Aristotle's view. Which standard of superiority does Collins refer to? It is quite evident that Aristotle's view can be seen to be more advanced if the liberalists have overlooked the reasonable questions Collins asks in the light of Aristotle's texts. However, if we take into account the different presuppositions behind the different theories, it seems that the theories are meant to be answers to somewhat different questions. It follows that they are not easily (if at all) commensurable.

A critical attitude towards liberalist theory is a pervasive characteristic of Collins's book as a whole. This is reflected by the structure of the book: the first main chapter, "Liberal Citizenship and Aristotle's Ethics", is an extensive critique of the Kantian-Rawlsian liberalist tradition, and the subsequent five chapters give an alternative account that is based on Aristotle's discussion of the relevant topics in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, including citizen virtue, justice, prudence, citizenship and political wit. The chapters on Aristotle are chiefly descriptive in nature. The author frequently cites the text in support of her overall interpretation, but she did not go into the scholarly debates on the details. Footnotes include useful references to commentaries and secondary literature.

In her Conclusion, Collins restates her main arguments and shows how Aristotle's view can enlighten us on certain difficulties inherent in the liberalist theories. She points out, for
example, that "Aristotle does more than challenge the liberal claim that the good is an open question" (p. 172). She continues: "He also compels us to explore a crucial dimension of citizenship that liberal individualism naturally obscures: the complex relation between the noble (to kalon) and the good" (ibid.). This is a powerful conclusion. At first reading, I was unable to tell how Collins wanted to use this conclusion, but on reflection, I discovered that there are basically two ways that are equally applicable to most of her discussion on Aristotle: first, a careful study of Aristotle's account can, by way of contrast, help us to identify certain problems in liberalism, and second, certain parts of Aristotle's account, if correctly understood, can help us to improve and modify the liberalist theory without abandoning the core liberalist commitments such as the view that the regime and the law cannot determine a correct way of living.

The evidence Collins examines is so extensive that a reader should not expect a detailed textual analysis of all passages. On certain points, however, a more closer analysis would have been helpful. I had some difficulties following, for example, her exposition of the particular justice that is related to the distribution and retribution of goods in NE 5.2 (pp. 77–80). Collins argued that "the deepest difficulty that Aristotle points to in his account of particular justice is the tension between moral virtue's orientation toward the common good and its requirements and activity as an independent end" (pp. 79–80). In support of this interpretation, she referred to NE 5.2, 1130b25–29 in which Aristotle states that we need to postpone our discussion on whether the education of the good man is a matter of politics or some other discipline. Aristotle adds that, perhaps, being a good man is not in every case the same as being a good citizen. In contrast to what Collins claims, the dissimilarity referred to need not indicate that there is a tension within moral virtue.

Another point in need of further clarification relates to Collins's argument that the virtue connected with political rule has, in Aristotle's view, a dual character (i.e. ruling and being ruled) (Politics 3.4, 1277b18–20), "which conflicts with Aristotle's initial insistence that the virtue of a good man is single and complete" (p. 127; reference to 1276b32–33). I failed to see how the two passages give rise to a conflict: is it because the virtue's being single is at variance with its being dual? As I see it, Aristotle's "single and complete" virtue refers here to the kind of justice he discusses in NE 5.2. Aristotle says there that the justice in question includes all virtues, and that it is complete because it can be exercised not only in relation to oneself, but also in relation to other people. This suggests that being a single virtue (i.e. justice) does not exclude being many virtues at the same time: one and the same virtue can be given different descriptions depending on how it is exercised.

Mika Perälä


Kutash's book is a summary and analysis of the arguments of Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, structured around the doctrine of the "ten gifts of the demiurge". According to Proclus (In Tim. 2.5,17–13, repeated PT 5 ch. 72), Timaeus teaches that the demiurgic god, producing the world, starts with bodies 1) making the world sensible by sight and touch, 2) unites bodies