example, that "Aristotle does more than challenge the liberal claim that the good is an open question" (p. 172). She continues: "He also compels us to explore a crucial dimension of citizenship that liberal individualism naturally obscures: the complex relation between the noble (to kalon) and the good" (ibid.). This is a powerful conclusion. At first reading, I was unable to tell how Collins wanted to use this conclusion, but on reflection, I discovered that there are basically two ways that are equally applicable to most of her discussion on Aristotle: first, a careful study of Aristotle's account can, by way of contrast, help us to identify certain problems in liberalism, and second, certain parts of Aristotle's account, if correctly understood, can help us to improve and modify the liberalist theory without abandoning the core liberalist commitments such as the view that the regime and the law cannot determine a correct way of living.

The evidence Collins examines is so extensive that a reader should not expect a detailed textual analysis of all passages. On certain points, however, a more closer analysis would have been helpful. I had some difficulties following, for example, her exposition of the particular justice that is related to the distribution and retribution of goods in NE 5.2 (pp. 77–80). Collins argued that "the deepest difficulty that Aristotle points to in his account of particular justice is the tension between moral virtue's orientation toward the common good and its requirements and activity as an independent end" (pp. 79–80). In support of this interpretation, she referred to NE 5.2, 1130b25–29 in which Aristotle states that we need to postpone our discussion on whether the education of the good man is a matter of politics or some other discipline. Aristotle adds that, perhaps, being a good man is not in every case the same as being a good citizen. In contrast to what Collins claims, the dissimilarity referred to need not indicate that there is a tension within moral virtue.

Another point in need of further clarification relates to Collins's argument that the virtue connected with political rule has, in Aristotle's view, a dual character (i.e. ruling and being ruled) (Politics 3.4, 1277b18–20), "which conflicts with Aristotle's initial insistence that the virtue of a good man is single and complete" (p. 127; reference to 1276b32–33). I failed to see how the two passages give rise to a conflict: is it because the virtue's being single is at variance with its being dual? As I see it, Aristotle's "single and complete" virtue refers here to the kind of justice he discusses in NE 5.2. Aristotle says there that the justice in question includes all virtues, and that it is complete because it can be exercised not only in relation to oneself, but also in relation to other people. This suggests that being a single virtue (i.e. justice) does not exclude being many virtues at the same time: one and the same virtue can be given different descriptions depending on how it is exercised.

Mika Perälä


Kutash's book is a summary and analysis of the arguments of Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, structured around the doctrine of the "ten gifts of the demiurge". According to Proclus (In Tim. 2.5,17–13, repeated PT 5 ch. 72), Timaeus teaches that the demiurgic god, producing the world, starts with bodies 1) making the world sensible by sight and touch, 2) unites bodies
in it through proportion and links, 3) makes it a whole composed of wholes, 4) gives it a spheri-
cal shape, 5) makes the world self-sufficient, 6) assigns to it a circular movement appropriate
for intellect, 7) animates it by a divine soul and establishes itself as the father of all souls, 8)
generates time by making world revolving, 9) establishes stars as sanctuaries for the gods who
jointly produce the measurable year and 10) perfects the world filling it with the living beings
who are images of the four basic forms of the intelligible world.

Some scholars have thought that Proclus is merely following Plato's lemmata, others
see this particular doctrine as a means of summarizing in advance books three and perhaps also
four of his huge commentary. Kutash opines that the notion of the ten gifts is the basic inter-
pertive device through which Proclus' vast philosophical, theological and mythical material
is ordered throughout the rest of the work: "... despite the constraint that the successive lem-
mata put on Proclus' priorities, a supervening structure to the Commentary does emerge and
calibrate roughly with the progression of the ten gifts ... Since the ten gifts span the creation of
the physical world and culminate with its completion, at least as far as this overriding theme
is concerned, the five extant books form coherent and systematic treatment as a self-contained
sequence." (p. 16).

Kutash aims to follow the structure of Proclus' exposition as far as possible. She
provides first an introductory chapter, then a chapter on the historical circumstances of Proclus'
school (that is, pagan intellectuals' condition in the Christian environment of the fifth century).
Chapters 3–6 are exactly mapped to the respective "gifts" (1–4). Chapter 12 serves as conclu-
sion. Chapters 7–11 do not, to my mind, always directly concern the doctrine of the gifts. The
disposition enables the author to engage in a discussion of a number of topics current in Pro-
clean studies. It is useless to try to enumerate all these topics here.

The major weakness of the book is a certain Anglo-Saxon research provincialism.
There is no discussion of how the new English translation (of Tarrant et al., 2007–09) relates
to that of Festugière (1966–68). An innocent reader would not even know from this book that
there exists an alternative and the only complete modern translation of Proclus' commentary.
Festugière is mentioned once in the index, and that turns to be a reference to Baltzly referring
to Festugière. Proclus' Commentary of the Republic and Festugière's translation of it are includ-
red in the bibliography of primary sources, but never used for detailed exegesis. Beierwaltes,
Trouillard, Segonds and Lernould are mentioned, but mostly as ornaments and usually through
works of authors writing in English.

Kutash uses the Platonic Theology also mainly through second-hand references. The
reader expecting a comparison between the exposition of the ten gifts in the Commentary on
Timaeus and Proclus' magnum opus remains disappointed.

It is a pity that the book actually ignores Alain Lernould's substantial contribution where
he gives an alternative assessment on the doctrine of the ten gifts. Thus this book does not
provide a fully adequate depiction of the previous research. On the one hand, Lernould's view
would support Kutash's point of the presence of a coherent structure beyond Plato in the com-
mentary. On the other hand, Lernould argues that the series of the ten gifts is only a secondary
division, being subordinated to the exposition of the tripartite demiurge and demiurgy (Phys-

There are also some minor problems. The index locorum does not include all the pas-
sages referred to (e.g. p. 151, In Tim. 2,138,17–23). Some articles are mentioned, which are not
found in the bibliography (e.g. note 44, p. 255 Edward Butler's article in Dionysius 23 [2005]).
The introduction repeats similar sentences over the very first paragraphs. In fact, the introduction would have been better without the first ten pages.

Reading this book has given me a more clear understanding of the decisive role which the famous pair of principles following immediately the One – Limit and Unlimited – plays in the commentary. This distinction is ubiquitously present in all Proclean reality, as Kutash rightly says, and it seems to be a leading principle structuring Proclus' metaphysics at the time of the composition of the commentary. From Kutash's treatment there emerges the impression that the henads do not have as high a profile in the commentary. Since henads also mediate between the One and Being, the question arises of the relation between the henads and the principles of Limit and Unlimited.

Kutash seems to subscribe to the view that Proclus' thought remained quite unitary throughout his whole career. However, in the *Platonic Theology* Limit and Unlimited seem to be the first henads, manifesting from the One. Proclus also introduced the intermediate classes of the gods, the noetic-noeric and hypercosmic-encosmic gods, which are not present in the *Commentary on Timaeus*. It may be possible to explain their absence in the *Elements of Theology* on the ground that the terse disposition of this extremely systematic work does not allow space for the intermediate classes. The prevailing role of the pair of principles without clarity on how they relate to the henads, and the absence of intermediaries in a work prone to proliferation of divine entities, and certainly free of the constraints of conceptual austerity characterizing *ET*, reveal relative the discrepancy between theologies of the commentary and *PT*. I think that we cannot avoid the conclusion that at the time of writing of the *Commentary on Timaeus* and probably *ET* as well, Proclus had not yet solved the question of the relationship between principles and henads, nor introduced intermediate classes of the gods. An in-depth discussion on these issues would perhaps have modified to some extent Kutash's opinion that Proclus' works are "contiguous rather than developmental in doctrine" (p. 7).

Another thought-provoking detail is Kutash's endeavor not only to demonstrate Proclus' significance for the "perennial questions" of philosophy, but also to untie Proclean knots with the aid of modern thought, sometimes sought from unexpected quarters. An example of this is how the author brings forth theories of Ignacio Matte Blanco regarding non-discursive thought. This is a bold move, as introducing psychoanalysis may cause some of the audience to recoil. Matte Blanco's thought on the unconscious, symmetry and asymmetry really seems to resemble Neoplatonist concepts. The author deserves thanks for introducing this theorist who is perhaps not so well known outside psychoanalysis and related studies.

I do not agree with the author on the incompatibility of philosophical monism and polytheistic theology. Although Kutash refers to Smith (p. 208) who pointed out some of the contrasting evidence, her concept of theurgy is basically in line with the traditional, standard view of primacy of theurgy in Proclus (derived mainly from Dodds, modified by Sheppard and most recently, with slightly different context, for example, by Rappe). In the question of non-discursive thinking her distinctions are not fine-grained enough, because she considers the issue on the 'mystical' level only, and does not take into account that thinking of the intellect could be already characterized with good reason as non-discursive, and that Proclus assumes different levels even in the hypernoetic 'thinking'. But if one cannot share these views, however, it should be said that they are clearly stated.

Kutash's attempt to demonstrate that Proclus' use of the verb ἐξαιρέω conveys a more radical notion of transcendence than what is expressed by ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, does not con-
vince at the first reading, but is worth being taken into consideration (pp. 9, 13, 20, 108, 199, 249). Her discussion of Proclus’ fear towards rebellious matter and disordered infinity is most interesting (especially pp. 12, 61–3, 111–2). One finds her emphasis of Proclus’ emphasis regarding infinity in the One itself stimulating (especially pp. 231, 243–9).

All these and many other points make Kutash’s book a rewarding read.

Tuomo Lankila


Ecco un nuovo contributo sulla etnicità antica, un filo di ricerca che continua a fiorire sulla scia dei lavori di Jonathan Hall, Greg Woolf e altri. Il libro di Kühr si presenta con lo scopo di illustrare il rapporto tra ethnos (dei Beozi) e città (di Tebe). Dopo un capitolo introduttivo di stampo teoretico su "mito, identità e memoria", l’autrice offre uno sguardo ai testi più significativi riguardanti il territorio della Beozia (il Catalogo delle navi dell'Iliade, l’inn omerico ad Apollo, la descrizione nel IX libro di Strabone, e il libro IX di Pausania) per poi analizzare le storie (apparentemente contraddittorie) della fondazione di Tebe (da parte di Cadmo) e altri miti relativi alla città (Anfione e Zeto, i sette contro Tebe, Edipo, ecc.). Significativamente, Kühr considera la topografia tebana come un'espressione delle pretese locali nei confronti di più miti. Le origini tebane di Ercole, un eroe beozio e panellenico (pp. 167sgg.), per esempio, si manifestano concretamente attraverso un noto culto locale. Tutto sommato, un prezioso studio, anche se forse eccessivamente concentrato sulla città di Tebe e i suoi miti a scapito delle altre località beozie e le loro tradizioni che probabilmente una volta erano più importanti di quanto suggerito dalle fonti oggi disponibili.

Mika Kajava


In this illuminating study, Seth Schwartz, a specialist of Classical Jewish Civilization, and known for his monographs Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 BCE to 640 CE (2004) and Josephus and Judean Politics (1990), seeks to answer the question he poses in the title.

Schwartz's book is divided into six carefully constructed chapters, plus two appendices in which the relevant texts that were too long to be included in the bulk of the chapters are to be found. Chapter 1 is entitled "Reciprocity and Solidarity" and deals with these concepts from a social-anthropological point of view. Chapter 2, "The Problem with Mediterraneanism", concerns the construction of "Mediterraneanism". Schwartz presents the scholarly history of this concept and argues for its continued usability today, but merely as a heuristic tool. These two chapters thus make up the theoretical framework of the study. The following three chap-