The book has no illustrations. This editorial decision seems questionable, as a non-specialist reader could certainly have benefited from some visual aid and clarifications. A more important role for visual material would also have fitted well with Scodel's multi-faceted approach.

However, the positives easily outweigh the negatives. Scodel's general approach is to be commended, and especially praiseworthy is her readiness to present her views on many debatable issues. Scodel writes in a sharp and thoughtful style, and a reader with little previous acquaintance with the subject matter is supportively guided to comprehend the complexity of Greek tragedy, but the book does offer food for thought for advanced students as well.

Kalle Knaapi


Dana Lacourse Munteanu (from now on DLM) states her aim in the Preface: "this book is an examination of how ancient Greeks described and understood the emotions stirred by tragedy" (p. ix). The subheading of the book refers, however, to the real players: not ancient Greeks in general, but some Greek philosophers and some tragedies: Gorgias (pp. 37–51), Plato (pp. 52–69), Aristotle (pp. 70–138), Aeschylus' *Persians* (pp. 151–63), *Prometheus Bound* (pp. 164–80), Sophocles' *Ajax* (pp. 181–207), and Euripides' *Orestes* (208–37). Aristotle's *Poetics* is not mentioned in the subheading, but naturally it is his short work and its depiction of tragic emotions – "pity" (*eleos*) and "fear" (*fobos*) – which dominates DLM's discussion in her book. It would not be complete without handling the peculiar affections Aristotle assimilated to tragedy: tragic pleasure and *catharsis*. Owing to its complicated nature, DLM deals with catharsis separately in the Appendix ("Catharsis and the emotions in the definition of tragedy in the *Poetics*").

To the interesting question of why Aristotle chose pity and fear as the very emotions arising from tragedy, DLM answers, of course, by adducing Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen*, mentioning also Plato's *Ion* 533d–e, though only in a footnote, p. 94 n. 65. Furthermore, the book begins with a brief survey of the Indian dramatic tradition (in which DLM does not claim any expertise) as an example of Indo-European dramatic art (pp. 29–36). DLM suggests that emphasizing "pity" as the emotional experience of tragic art seems to be unique to the Greeks – based perhaps on the influence of their great subtext, Homer's epics. DLM refers at various times to the concluding scene of pity in the *Iliad*. However, later on she speaks of the "pleasure of mourning", which is combined with an ancient "Indo-European technique of consolation", that is, that mourning functions not only as an outlet of emotions but also as a way to put one's own sorrows and sufferings in perspective (pp. 136–8). Instead of these vague suggestions, there could have been a more precise outline of the conceptions of pity and fear in the Greek context (pp. 14–20), accompanied by a survey of their lexical variety and modern equivalents (like sympathy, empathy, dread and anxiety).

DLM notes that the Greeks also distinguished between other emotions that tragedy or artworks in general were supposed to arouse. She points out the passage of Gorgias' *Encomium*, where the rhetorician speaks not only of pity (toward Helen) but also of hate (toward Paris),...
which his speech is supposed to elicit. In addition, DLM handles Gorgias' fragment pertaining to tragedy as "deception" and connects it with the relevant passages of the contemporary treatise *Dissoi Logoi*. The fact that the emotions felt while experiencing a "deceptive" art work could, in fact, be genuine, did not constitute any problem for Gorgias.

For Plato, however, the "untruthful" nature of art works seems to correspond to the emotions they arouse in the audience: the tragic emotions as depicted by the interlocutors in Plato's dialogues are seen as morally degenerative at their worst. DLM's treatment of Plato is succinct, but includes the most relevant passages. Most interestingly, she notes that the "staging" of the *Apology* reminds one of the tragic plot (an innocent man is condemned) and that Phaedo in a way declares how one should react to the "tragedy" of Socrates: not feeling any pity (*eleos*), because Socrates did not fear death and did not make a show of his suffering (cf. *Phd. 58e1–3*) (p. 67). According to DLM, Plato's more or less deliberate "mistake" was to confuse the aesthetic emotions of the audience with real life ones (the emotions of the performer and the audience are, however, clearly kept apart in *Ion* 535d). Therefore, DLM suggests that Aristotle was the first "theorist" of aesthetic emotions.

In making this argument, DLM quotes not only the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* (III, 1385b11–86b7, where Aristotle presents two kinds of *eleos*: one caused by "real events", and another caused by "artistic representation", cf. p. 91), but also quite well-known passages of *De memoria* and *De anima* pertaining to the similarities and differences between imagination (*phantasia*), which includes anticipation and memory. The underlining supposition, to which the present reviewer agrees to a certain extent, is that for Aristotle tragedy was mostly something that happened for the eyes of the mind (pp. 84–9). Furthermore, DLM suggests that Aristotle thought that tragedy (or "fiction" or artwork) works like memory: remembering the absent object as a representation and watching an object of *mimesis* are similar kinds of mental processes (p. 102). DLM acknowledges her debt for these ideas to G. M. Sifakis, and surely these passages will help us understand the conception of tragic pity and fear – as detached emotions needing an imaginative involvement of the spectator/reader. Thus, DLM interprets Aristotelian tragic emotions as kinds of "intellectual" emotions, as recognitions: tragic fear is essentially our human anxiety in the face of future calamities (based on the remembrance or knowledge of past ones) and pity a realization that everyone is exposed to this fear in some way or another. However, tragic emotions as aesthetic emotions still remain quite obscure and tragic pleasure even more so.

DLM has successfully used the current blossoming of research on the *Poetics*. One of the scholars of the subject, Elizabeth Belfiore, also read an early version of this book. DLM differs in one important respect from Belfiore's view regarding the pleasure of tragedy. While Belfiore sees Aristotelian tragic pleasure ultimately as cognitive and thus also somewhat divorced from pity and fear (p. 107), DLM suggests that pity and fear are essential emotions for the formation of the pleasure of tragedy. The crucial passage for this idea is in the *Poetics* 14,1453b12.

DLM argues that Aristotle advocated a certain kind of tragic pleasure (*oikeia hédoné*) which was not just pleasure derived from accurate *mimesis*. Tragic pleasure also needs the activating of memory and detachment from the tragic events (p. 128). Tragic pleasure can be compared to the potentially positive aspects of mourning ("the pleasure of mourning"), whereby case we not only process our sorrow, but also through memory create an image of the
deceased person as a form of consolation for us. When DLM sees Aristotelian tragic pleasure as the result of a complicated mental process of realizing and recognizing tragic pity and fear, the question arises how tragic pleasure is connected with catharsis. She does not deal with this problem in her Appendix, which essentially is a survey of the most notable views pertaining to catharsis.

If the first part of the book brings out quite familiar thematizations with new suggestions, Part II is an analysis of the occurrences of the descriptions of pity and fear in some tragedies, whose selection is based on the "diversity of styles" (p. 142). In addition to the above-mentioned tragedies, DLM briefly handles Sophocles' Oedipus in Colonus and Philoctetes and Euripides' Medea and Helen. Her main observation is that tragic characters not only reveal their sufferings for all to see or realize, but also direct others by their speech and actions to react to their situation. This guiding can, however, have a different effect on the internal audience (the characters of the play) and the external audience (the spectators/readers of the tragedy). The fear, for instance, which Odysseus feels while seeing Ajax's madness, is also the fear that Ajax's misfortune could befall on him, too – the idea of the contamination of misfortune. The spectators of this scene are not in imminent danger and this is also the reason why they can feel a more "abstract" kind of fear. Furthermore, DLM shows how both pity and fear have a rich variety of instances in these tragedies. In this way she makes her point clearer: the Aristotelian tragic emotions are certain kinds of complicated and detached emotions.

In all, this book is a commendable contribution to the interpretation of tragic emotions. The emphasis is on the philosophy of the mind and aesthetics instead of the ethico-political point of view, according to which modern scholarship until recently has tended to interpret Aristotelian tragic emotions. The exposition is clear and easily comprehensible. Sometimes, however, the reader wonders if DLM has given enough thought to her target audience – the experts or the novices or those in between? She does, for example, point (although only in a footnote) out the obvious fact that Politics VIII "has sometimes been held as a model for catharsis in the Poetics" (p. 239 n. 6). Regrettably, there is no index locorum.

Tua Korhonen


The Cambridge Companion series has offered easily digestible, well-written and reliable essays on many research topics in classics since the 1980s. This volume presents a many-sided picture of theatre in Greece and Rome. It contains 16 essays divided in two parts (8 essays per part), each essay being followed by endnotes and suggestions for further reading. The volume begins with an introduction by the editors McDonald and Walton (pp. 1–9). As an opening statement they write that the book is about theatre, not plays and playwrights, and that it is about "the circumstances of presentation rather than the material that was presented". This is a most welcome approach since ancient theatre was about doing and seeing – the texts that we have are only a thin slice of the whole. The volume succeeds in presenting the central themes