sentiment is not surprising, and the pro-aristocratic and oligarchic opinions were then handed down by Aristotle to Alexander, who made his own interpretation of them.

The fifth narrative ("The Hellenistic Greek world, c. 300–30 BCE") looks at the Hellenistic age, which is described as a transition from the Greek world to the Roman Empire. To illustrate political thought in the Hellenistic age, C. has chosen Sparta as a case study (Chapter 9). First the author presents an overview of the phenomenon called anti-politics, i.e. refusal of political participation as a way to influence the community. In ancient Greece, this attitude was shown either in the advocacy of a withdrawal from politics to a self-sufficient life or in the creation of imaginative ideal places to live. The latter, called the utopian tendency by C., appears in the writings of Athenian authors (e.g. Plato and Xenophon) and most (e)utopias seem to be influenced by idealized perceptions of the Spartan way of life in the ascetic and communalist Lycurgan style. In reality, Sparta was in decay by the middle of the 3rd century in both internal and external affairs and did not have much in common with these idealized views. However, it did go through two attempts to reform the city politically, economically and socially. These attempts, by King Agis IV and King Cleomenes III, were so radical, that they deserve to be called the "Spartan revolution". C. points out that although the results of these reforms were short-lived they appear to be real attempts to put utopian theory into practice.

In the final narrative ("Graecia capta"), C. approaches the development of political theories in the Greek world that had become subject to Roman rule. C. states (in Chapter 10) that in "the massy shape of Cicero" (p. 124) the inheritance of Greek political thinkers was transferred to Rome. The main character of the chapter is, however, Plutarch, a Greek and Roman citizen, whose writings reflect a realistic adaptation to circumstances, and yet do not conceal the powerless state of the Greeks in the Roman Empire.

In his concluding chapter, C. summarizes his main theses: Greek poleis and their politics were profoundly different from our societies, they were not by any means 'liberal' in the modern (Western) sense. That, however, does not mean that there is not something to learn from ancient Greek politics. C. touches upon some obvious pain spots in our own democratic systems (e.g., the power of mass media and the problems of representative democracy) and makes the reader see that we, in fact, are wrestling with problems surprisingly similar to the ancient Greek poleis.

In this book, Cartledge navigates the reader through different stages of the Greek world of politics, and does it in a fascinating and entertaining way. His style is that of an established, first-class British scholar: thought provoking, loaded with intellectual and academic substance, and yet, extremely enjoyable to read.

Tiina Purola


Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith argue in this book against a widely shared interpretation of Socrates' moral psychology. Socrates is believed to have an intellectualist view of human moral psychology, according to which virtue is a kind of knowledge and human
motivation is always directed towards actions that rational judgement considers best for the agent. Brickhouse and Smith think that Socrates was an intellectualist, but they do not share the traditional way of understanding his intellectualism. This book focuses on the motivational side of intellectualism, but there is a discussion about the nature of virtue as well and these two sides of intellectualism are closely connected.

The widely shared interpretation of Socratic moral psychology that Brickhouse and Smith call "the standard interpretation" understands Socrates' motivational intellectualism very straightforwardly, allowing only rational desires to have a role in motivating human beings to act. This view is what Brickhouse and Smith want to challenge. According to them, Daniel Devereux was the first scholar who seriously challenged the standard interpretation in his paper in 1995. Brickhouse and Smith have been much inspired by Devereux, but their interpretation of Socrates differs from Devereux's in at least one important aspect.

The book begins with an "Apology of Socratic studies" (Chapter I), defending the idea of philosophical differences in Plato's early and later dialogues and emphasizing the need for specific Socratic studies. One of the challenges for the writers is to hold the "Socratic" moral psychology (represented in the early dialogues) separate and different from the "Platonic" (later dialogues), while interpreting Socrates in a way that would actually seem to bring him closer to Plato.

The standard interpretation of Socrates' motivational intellectualism allows only for rational desires to motivate human beings to act. It also assumes that rational desires always adjust to the agent's beliefs of what is best for him. Therefore, according to the standard interpretation, Socrates believes that we can only affect a person's actions by changing his rational beliefs of what is best for him. Brickhouse and Smith see many problems in this view. In Chapter II, they criticize it by showing that the central claims of the standard view are not consistent with a lot of what Socrates says in the early dialogues. By giving examples from several early dialogues, Brickhouse and Smith show that Socrates seems to recognize very well the causal relevance of other forces than rational desires in motivating human action. But how is this possible if he is an intellectualist? Brickhouse and Smith face the challenge of explaining this.

In Chapter III, Brickhouse and Smith present their own view of Socrates' moral psychology. In their view, Socrates recognizes the possibility of the strong influence of appetites and passions on the rational judgment of a human being. Brickhouse and Smith believe that even though Socrates holds the view that an action is ultimately caused by a rational judgment, he understands the need to take into account the influence of appetites and passions on judgment. According to Brickhouse and Smith, the main problem with the standard interpretation is that it does not allow any nonrational desires to cause changes in motivation and it is therefore unable to explain obvious cases where rational beliefs remain the same, but actions changes. Brickhouse and Smith's interpretation can explain these cases, because it allows Socrates to believe that strong appetites and passions can influence rational judgment in a way that prevents consideration of all relevant facts.

In Brickhouse and Smith's understanding of Socrates, being virtuous requires keeping appetites and passions in a disciplined order. This point is central, and this is where Brickhouse and Smith differ from Daniel Devereux. In Devereux's view, a virtuous person might have strong appetites and passions, but his ethical knowledge would provide a stronger motivational force for action. In Brickhouse and Smith's view this is not possible, as strong appetites and passions are incompatible with virtuous action. Brickhouse and Smith are suspicious about the
idea that Socrates would consider ethical knowledge to be a necessary and sufficient condition for virtue, as Devereux thinks. They point out that Socrates repeatedly denied any possession of ethical knowledge, but still believed that he acted in a morally sustainable manner. Brickhouse and Smith believe that the key to explaining this is Socrates' disciplined appetites and passions. An agent with disciplined appetites and passions is not inclined to succumb to false impressions and is therefore able to deliberate more correctly, even if he does not have sure ethical knowledge.

In Chapter IV, Brickhouse and Smith look at the problem of the standard interpretation from a different angle, seeking further support for their own view. They aim to show that there is a major weakness in the standard interpretation in explaining Socrates' claim that wrongdoing damages the wrongdoer's soul. According to the standard view, the only possible defect of a wrongdoer's soul is ignorance. This does not seem to adequately explain the damage to the soul; what, for example, would an incurably ruined soul (like the tyrant's soul) be like. Would it be totally ignorant? In Brickhouse and Smith's view, something important is lacking from the standard intellectualist explanation.

Brickhouse and Smith point out that if the standard interpretation was correct, cognitive measures like education and philosophical dialogue would be sufficient to change the actions of a wrongdoer. However, Socrates acknowledges the need for various other types of measures to correct wrongdoing as well, for example physical punishment, imprisonment, fines and so on. Punishment is never a revenge in Socrates' view, but it is aimed at curing the wrongdoer. But the "cures" he mentions are diverse, not only cognitive measures. How would this make sense if all there was to correct in wrongdoing was ignorance? Brickhouse and Smith remark that despite the high value Socrates gives to knowledge, he seems to understand that there are other factors affecting motivation as well, contrary to what the standard interpretation claims. In Brickhouse and Smith's view, the key to correcting wrongdoing lies in limiting the overwhelming power of appetites and passions. In Chapter V, they discuss in more detail what is involved in educating appetites and passions.

In Chapter VI, Brickhouse and Smith consider the relation of their interpretation of Socrates' motivational intellectualism to the other side of Socrates' intellectualism, the claim that virtue is a kind of knowledge. This combination is challenging, as it is not easy to fit non-rational desires into the intellectualist picture. In Brickhouse and Smith's view, virtue is a kind of knowledge, but it presupposes a disciplined state of appetites and passions. They also claim that knowledge assures a kind of condition of the soul that is immune to the distorting effects of nonrational desires. But how is it possible to define virtue as knowledge if there is a prior requirement of disciplined appetites and passions? Brickhouse and Smith do not adequately explain this.

Chapter VII deals with Socrates' relation to his intellectual heirs, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Brickhouse and Smith explain how their view about Socrates differs importantly from Plato's later views, even though their understanding of Socrates seems to bring him closer to Plato. They find similarities in Socrates' and Aristotle's views about the distorting effects of nonrational desires on the power of reason and about the possibility of synchronic akrasia. They also discuss similarities and differences in Socrates' and the Stoics' views.

The book gives a good overall picture of Socrates' intellectualism and successfully challenges the standard interpretation of motivational intellectualism. Brickhouse and Smith offer a more plausible and thorough understanding of Socrates than the standard straightfor-
ward account does. However, it is not easy to combine the idea of intellectualism with the causal effect of nonrational desires and the possible problem for Brickhouse and Smith lies in their explanation of Socrates' conception of virtue as a kind of knowledge.

Susanna Aro


Sophie Henderson has skilfully translated into English Francesco Pelosi's monograph about music, soul and body in Plato. The translation is much needed because there are not many extensive philosophical studies on this topic available in English, and yet the topic is central in Plato's philosophy.

In the Introduction, Pelosi claims to be showing that a study of Plato's discussion on music helps us better understand his view of the relationship between soul and body. He contends that even if there are good grounds, especially in the Phaedo, for taking Plato as a proponent of a dualist theory, this issue is by no means settled. Even the Phaedo, the author argues, "presents ideas for a different vision of the mind-body problem". He continues: "But other dialogues offer many more numerous and consistent reasons to keep open the case for considering the mind-body question in Plato" (p. 5).

This general aim notwithstanding, there is not much in the book that directly addresses the issue about dualism between the soul and the body. However, this is not a major shortcoming, because the merits of the book lie elsewhere, in particular in the admirably detailed discussion of the many special issues in music. They constitute the body of the four main thematic chapters.

The principal sources include the Phaedo, Republic 2, 3, and 7, Laws 2 and 7, and the Timaeus. In addition to these, the author uses other sources, including ancient commentaries, to clarify, elaborate and contrast his arguments. He approaches the texts from an emphatically unitarian point of view, assuming that Plato's considerations in different dialogues and contexts are basically consistent. This is well grounded in most cases, but I would nevertheless have expected a more careful contextualization of the passages discussed.

The first chapter discusses musical paideia in early childhood, with special focus on ēthos and mīmēsis. In opposition to a "formalist" view of music, represented by the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara, for example, Pelosi argues that for Plato and many other ancient theorists, "music can express emotional and ethical states capable of substantially altering the human psychē and its emotive and cognitive faculties" (p. 31). In this respect, Plato's discussion of harmoniai and rhythms are of the greatest interest. As is well known, Plato takes the Dorian and Phrygian harmoniai to express two key ethical qualities: courage and temperance (Resp. 399a3–c6), and Pelosi puts special effort into clarifying this connection.

While the first chapter concentrates on the sensitive parts of the soul, the second chapter explores music as a therapy for the rational soul. Pelosi uses as his key evidence here Timaeus 47c–e, which fits this purpose very well. One of his major arguments is that musical therapy is based on "the contact between substances that are akin (syngeneis)" (p. 75; Pelosi's italics). The