Hesiod's *Theogony* and the *peri physeōs* tradition, and in the end shows how *Timaeus* transcends this opposition of religious story and scientific explanation. It is possible to disagree with Burnyeat's thoughts about the reason for and the free choice of the creation of the cosmos. However, the brilliance of the article lies in its understanding of the *eikōn* (image) nature of the cosmos and how this applies to speaking: if speech is speaking according to the subject matter, which is already an image relation, speaking about the cosmos must perform the *eikōn* (image) nature of the cosmos. Hence, the exegesis of the *logoi* of the cosmos is always a likely account. *Timaeus* is a myth but it is also an exegesis of the myth that applies the meaning of the myth.

The role that *Timaeus* has in the introduction and in the articles of Betegh and Burnyeat does imply that, in the volume as a whole, the importance of the myth of the cosmos in the relation of *muthos* and *logos* is recognised. However, in many articles the perspective is still tightly bound to the traditional division of myth and logos which as such was a philosophical question for Plato.

*Salla Raunio*


Christopher Long discusses in this monograph Aristotle's conception of truth, which is commonly taken to be a version of the correspondence theory. According to this theory, truth is to be understood in terms of correspondence or agreement between states of affairs in the world, on the one hand, and an assertive or negative sentence or thought, on the other. Long subscribes to this understanding of Aristotle's view, but his attempt is to propose an entirely new interpretation of what Aristotle requires of the implied correspondence.

Long characterizes his approach as "phenomenological legomenology" (p. x), which he takes to be firmly based on Aristotle's own way of doing philosophy. Long claims, "The peripatetic methodology is legomenology." He continues, "The things said, τὰ λεγόμενα, open a way into the nature of things; and it is the nature of things to express themselves" (p. 7). Long emphasizes the idea that it is not only human beings but also things that express themselves. He finds evidence for this even in Aristotle's famous formulation τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς (Metaphysics Z 1, 1028a10), in which λέγεται is commonly understood to be in the passive voice, and translated as "Being is said in many ways". According to Long (p. 12), however, λέγεται can also be heard in the middle voice, which results in the translation "Being expresses itself in many ways". In line with this, he introduces his new understanding of truth in Aristotle thus: "...truth belongs neither to thinking nor to things, but to their encounter – an encounter in which truth is always a matter of onto-logical response-ability, that is, of eco-logical justice" (p. 11).

This is a very pregnant account, and needs some explanation. Long divides the terms "onto-logical", "response-ability" and "eco-logical" with a hyphen deliberately, arguing that truth is by no means a one-sided affair, but requires contributions from both parties involved in a social context. It is a matter of justice because cultivation of truth requires "the ability to attend to the ways things speak and to articulate responses that do justice to the saying of things" (p. 14).
In my view, this is not an entirely implausible thesis to begin with, but requires a great deal of specification. To all intents and purposes, this is what Long sets out to do in the book. He does not confine himself to discussing only texts that explicitly concern truth and falsity, in particular *De Interpretatione*, *Metaphysics* Δ 7, E 4 and Θ 10, and *De Anima* 3.6. In addition, he examines a number of other texts to elaborate on the proposed view. In some cases, I think, he even goes too far. As regards τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in *Metaphysics* Z 4, 1029b14 (pp. 176–90), for example, I found it difficult to see how his discussion contributed to his main arguments about truth.

The book consists of eight main chapters. The division is thematic: the first three chapters discuss in various ways the method in the study of truth as "correspondence" and of the things said, the fourth chapter concerns λόγος, the fifth and sixth are about perception, appearance and thought, the seventh focuses on the good, and the eight on justice. This fits well with the general purposes of the book.

For the most part, Long's style of writing is very readable, though some parts are somewhat verbose and ornate. In part, this is due to his continental and pragmatist background, in part, due to his way of using later thinkers, in particular Heidegger, Dewey, Randall and Woodbridge, for clarification and contrast. However, he uses the texts of these thinkers in a truly critical fashion, being careful not to iron out the inevitable differences in relation to Aristotle. These comparative sections are especially helpful for a reader who is familiar with these later thinkers, but a reader with no such background, including the author of this review, may find them confusing rather than clarifying. In the case of Heidegger (pp. 33–48), the contrast Long draws becomes unreasonably long, turning into an independent study.

It is worth noting that there is no single text to which Long is able to refer as his key evidence. It is rather the totality of evidence that either corroborates or undermines his thesis, depending on one's judgment of the interpretation of each piece of evidence in question, and its interrelations. Thus, it seems, Long's thesis is most charitably taken as an overall interpretation of the significance of truth in Aristotle.

In my judgment, Long succeeds in developing a new way of speaking about truth as correspondence in Aristotle. Nevertheless, I was not convinced that the texts he cites in support strongly recommend the proposed discourse. In particular, I would have expected a more detailed exegesis of the texts in which Aristotle explicitly discusses truth and falsity. This would have made the book more balanced, and also more sensitive to the ways in which Aristotle himself formulates his position. Indeed, it is not until p. 169 that the reader learns that in *De Anima* 3.6 Aristotle distinguishes between "two senses of truth corresponding to two different sorts of things toward which thinking is directed". Only one of them, the truth involved in the thinking of composite items, i.e. making assertions and denials, is relevant to the concept of truth Long has discussed thus far. Furthermore, Long makes no attempt to discuss Aristotle's claim that the alleged "correspondence" is asymmetric in a very specific sense: "It is not because we think truly that you are white, that you are white, but because you are white we who say this have the truth" (*Metaphysics* Θ 10, 1051b6–9). This claim is important because it explains what makes a statement true. Long cites what immediately precedes this quote, but is content to state vaguely, "The emphasis here is clearly on the things themselves – they are somehow responsible for the truth or falsity of the λόγος" (p. 173; italics added).

I should like to add two minor observations. First, Long makes a baffling claim right in the beginning: "Yet Aristotle has no philosophy of language, no sustained systematic account
of the nature of language and how it functions in philosophical investigation" (p. 6). This is unintelligible given Aristotle's logical treatises and Long's own book. Second, Long puts some effort into showing that Aristotle's claim "it is necessary to proceed from the universal [ἐκ τῶν καθόλου] to the particulars [τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα]" (Physics 1,1, 184a23–24) is best understood as moving from undifferentiated wholes to what Heidegger calls "those moments that bring what is at first superficially meant into a compelling distance so that I actually see it in its articulateness" (p. 57). Heidegger's phrase is a very convoluted way of saying that the term τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα refers here to what is specific, and not to the particular. It would have been helpful to inform the reader that Aristotle uses this term in these two different senses.

Mika Perälä


Tony Roark has written an impressive book on Aristotle's account of time in Physics 4,10–14. His major argument is that the account is best understood in hylomorphic terms: as a compound of matter and form. In short, the proposal put forward is that the matter of time is movement, and the form of time is perception. Roark readily admits that his approach is rather uncontroersial given Aristotle's general tendency to apply his preferred hylomorphic framework to all kinds of explanatory purposes, but observes that the details require careful consideration. This is particularly the case with perception, the role of which is not entirely clear in Aristotle's theory.

The book is conveniently structured around the aforementioned major argument. Part II is devoted to movement, and Part III to perception. Part I serves as an introduction, contrasting Aristotle's approach with other lines of argument, in particular with McTaggart's and Plato's, whereas Part IV concentrates on some specific issues related to simultaneity and temporal passage, addressing objections raised to Aristotle's theory.

Roark begins by contrasting ancient and modern conceptions of time. For this purpose he introduces McTaggart's highly influential distinction between two series of time, the idea that the temporal relations "earlier than" and "later than" are more fundamental than, and to be separated from, the relations of "past", "present" and "future". Roark stresses that the former relations only imply temporal extension, whereas the latter also require some passage of time, and he applies the notions of "extension" and "passage" to clarify and contrast Plato's and Aristotle's views. In my judgement, the comparison given works well for introductory purposes, but on closer inspection "extension" and "passage" are not very helpful notions in clarifying what is distinctive about ancient views. First of all, the distinction in question does not seem to be relevant to ancient thinkers. Secondly, as Roark himself points out, there are other notions such as "periodicity" which better illuminate ancient intuitions. Nonetheless, Roark succeeds in making clear that Plato and Aristotle take time to be defined in terms of motion, and yet insist that motion is not similarly defined in terms of time. The latter claim is unintelligible to modern thinkers, and this constitutes a key contrast between the ancient and modern thinkers.

After this introductory part, Roark turns to the claim about motion as the matter of time. In Chapter 3 he discusses what he refers to as the "Exactly When" argument in Physics 4,11,