ing and image for the preservation of memory is noted as Assman explores an interesting contrast that occurred during the Renaissance. While English poets and scholars believed that rebirth could only take place through words, Italian artists thought that art was the true medium for this. Assman then shows the effects of book printing on memory and how writing became ephemeral and commonplace through this.

The chapters in the last part (Archives) contain further case studies but the focus shifts here from literature to art. It explores how artists such as Anselm Kiefer examine and use memory and forgetting in their works. Assman, thus, displays a multidisciplinary approach both in subject and material here. The last part focuses in particular on memory of the post-war period and how it is preserved and has become institutionalized. This is important, as Assman already noted in the introduction how the Second World War shattered cultural memory.

The particular strength of this work is how the author is able to call upon a vast body of evidence and knowledge in order to trace the uses of memory throughout history and can successfully discuss and connect views of memory as vastly disparate as those of Cicero, Shakespeare, and Wordsworth. This variety of approaches is not just shown in ancient authors but also in her handling of philosophers, sociologists, and artists. This results in an important and interesting volume which will be useful for scholars from various backgrounds. All in all, this combines into a comprehensive and thought-provoking overview of the history, use, and manipulation of memory, and this work will provide a theoretical framework for many scholarly works to come.

Ghislaine van der Ploeg


It may be said that there is an ongoing renaissance in the study of Roman Republicanism and its later reception. One of the main avenues has been the exploration of what has been dubbed “neo-Roman” thought, which has emphasized issues such as representative forms of popular participation in government and the conception of liberty. Both of these themes had, of course, a rich history in Roman constitutional thought that percolated into the European tradition from Machiavelli onwards.

Fezzi’s volume on the idea of res publica and libertas in the works of Benjamin Constant thus comes on the heels of a veritable torrent of scholarship. For an author, this brings both challenges and advantages. The primary advantage is that the theme is familiar and accepted, while the main challenge is that to say something new becomes exceedingly difficult. Fezzi himself appears to recognize this, situating his work at the outset beside the three big names in the field, Fergus Millar, Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. To study ancient and modern ideas comparatively is naturally an age-old pursuit, one that Constant himself undertook in his “The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” of 1819. Often dubbed the founder of modern liberalism, Constant was a crucial character whose peripatetic life took him to numerous intellectual and legal traditions that influenced his thought, bridging British conceptions of representative government and French
revolutionary ideas of individual rights and liberties. Thus, the volume explores an interesting and relevant topic but enters what is already a crowded field.

The result is that the book attempts to tell what Constant thought of Roman res publica and libertas and how that fits into the long line of the Republican tradition, through thinkers from Machiavelli to Arendt. Fezzi’s volume is a very learned discourse that covers an enormous territory, with sections on the latest reception of Republicanist thought and the fascinating life history of Constant himself, with the inevitable description of his relationship with Mme de Staël. The downside is that in under two hundred pages, with ample quotations from both Constant himself and his predecessors and successors, the discussion remains brief. This unfortunately does not allow Fezzi to develop his own ideas on the theme, the reception of Roman ideas and their transformation in particular being an area would have wanted to hear more about.

In conclusion, this is a very interesting introduction to an important topic, one that offers a comprehensive overview of the Republicanist discourse and the usages of the Roman tradition in modern political theories.

Kaius Tuori


Merito grande del presente studio è quello che dice con Aristotele e merito ancor più grande è quanto su Aristotele fa fecondamente germinare, come un’eco, nella domanda e nella contemplazione del lettore.

L’edizione del libro III della Politica di Aristotele curata da Paolo Accattino e Michele Curnis consta di quattro sezioni: i) un’agile introduzione al libro in oggetto; ii) una sezione bibliografica e un prospetto di sigle e abbreviazioni; iii) testo greco in edizione critica con una piana traduzione italiana a fronte; iv) un commento essenziale (di intendimento piuttosto esplicativo che non erudito ed esegetico, con sensibilità pressoché esclusiva agli aspetti storico-filosofici), cui segue un’appendix coniecturarum e un sintetico indice dei soli nomi propri antichi.

Il tema messo a fuoco da Aristotele nelle prime tre sezioni del libro (1274b32-1276b15) ha l’importanza della chiave di violino in una partitura musicale: vale di per sé ma, ancor di più, vale per la direzione che imprime al senso di quanto segue. In questi termini è possibile accostare la questione accampata ad aperturam dallo Stagirite, cioè la definizione e il rapporto che intercorre tra città (πόλις), cittadino (πολίτης) e cittadinanza costituzionale (πολιτεία). Come sul piano linguistico esiste un legame etimologico che collega i tre termini, così sul piano storico e ontologico esiste un rapporto costitutivo tra i medesimi referenti, corrispondenza che la definizione deve urgere a illustrare. Aristotele affronta la questione con il suo solito caveat, quello cioè secondo il quale l’oggetto si dice in molti modi (πολλαχῶς λέγεται), ragione per cui anche i cittadini si dicono in molti modi. Questa distinzione preliminare si riverbera nel distinguo per cui in una città si danno sia cittadini sia abitanti, senza che i due soggetti si identifichino; cittadino in senso stretto (τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην, 1275a19 ss.) sarà colui che gode dei diritti di cittadinanza nella città mentre il cittadino inteso lato